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Using a“data fundamentalist approach,” this study revisits the long debate about China’s 
growth performance by seriously tackling the existing data problems that have been the major 
obstacles to a proper assessment of China’s growth performance. First, this study examines 
and adjusts the serious break in the official employment statistics in 1990. Second, it provides 
an adjustment for the numbers employed by a human capital effect. Third, it tests the 
sensitivity of Maddison’s (1998a) “zero labor productivity growth” assumption in gauging 
the real growth of the so-called “non-material (including non-market) services.” Fourth, it 
further improves the author’s earlier physical output-based production index for the industrial 
sector (Wu, 2002a) by using multiple weights and time-variant value added ratios obtained 
from the Chinese input-output tables. The likely problem of “product quality” in such a 
physical measure is examined and rejected. Fifth, it provides a new set of estimates of capital 
stock for the aggregate economy using alternative deflators and depreciation rates, 
crosschecked by the author’s industry-level capital stock estimates (Wu, 2008b). This 
completely new data set is used in a Solow-type growth accounting exercise with different 
factor income share assumptions. The new results—under the full adjustment scenario for the 
post-reform period using input-output table income weights—show that the estimated annual 
TFP growth rate is 0.3 percent, which is substantially lower than the estimate of 3.1 percent 
derived from the official data without any major adjustment. A range of TFP estimates is also 
provided for each sub-period under different assumptions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The sources of China’s post-reform remarkable growth performance have been 
the subject of a heated debate. It draws a particular attention whenever the China 
model of reform and development is questioned. The center of the debate is whether 
China’s growth during the reform period is attributed mainly to productivity growth 
or to factor accumulation. Despite more and more studies have participated in the 
debate, the debate has remained inconclusive. Using the estimated total factor 
productivity (TFP) for the Chinese economy in the literature, which is a productivity 
measure in the neoclassical growth accounting framework that is considered crucial 
for the quality of an economy’s growth and its sustainability in the long run, we may 
approximately categorize the existing studies into two opposite groups, namely, an 
“optimistic camp” versus a “pessimistic camp”.  
The optimists may be represented by the most recent studies by Perkins and 
Rawski (2008) and Bosworth and Collins (2008) both attributing over 40 percent of 
China’s post-reform growth to TFP, that is, 3.8 percent of annual TFP growth for the 
period 1978-2005 in the former and 3.6 percent for 1978-2004 in the latter.
2 The 
pessimists may be represented by Young’s study (2003) which only accounts for 1.4 
percent of annual TFP growth for the period 1978-1998. Since Young only covers the 
non-agricultural economy, one may argue that his estimate for the TFP growth would 
have been even lower if agriculture were included, that is, at best TFP contributed not 
more than 15 percent of the growth in that period.
3 There are, however, estimates that 
stand in between including e.g. Wang and Yao (2002) who estimated 2.4 percent of 
annual TFP growth for 1978-1999.
4 
                                                 
2 There are studies that obtain the estimates of annual TFP growth rate around 3 percent including 
the work by Ren and Sun (2005) which estimated an annual TFP growth at 3.2 percent for 1980-2000, 
Maddison’s revised estimate (2007a) of 3 percent for 1978-2003, and an estimate of about 3 percent by 
He and Kuijs (2007) (an approximate average of 3.3 for 1978-93 and 2.8 for 1993-2005), though the 
periods covered in these studies are less comparable. 
3 Kalirajan et al. (1996) found that TFP growth in Chinese agriculture was negative in 16 of 
China’s 29 provinces in 1984-87 after a positive performance in almost all provinces in 1978-84. Mao 
and Koo (1997) found that 17 out of China’s 29 provinces experienced a decline in “technical 
efficiency” in 1984-93 in agricultural production. 
4 Cao et al. (2009) also provided a similar moderate estimate of annual TFP growth by 2.5 percent 
for 1982-2000.    3
One may argue that different time horizon and coverage present some difficulty 
when directly comparing the results of the previous studies. There are in fact more 
contradictory findings for shorter but more comparable periods. For example, for the 
reform period up to the mid-1990s, China’s annual TFP growth rate is estimated at 3.8 
and 3.9 percent for the period 1979-94 in Borensztein and Ostry (1996) and Hu and 
Khan (1997) and even as high as 4.2 percent for 1978-1995 in Fan et al. (1999). These 
results can be compared with a very low estimate at 1.1 percent for 1979-1993 by 
Woo (1998). Some studies stand in between, such as Maddison’s earlier estimate 
(1998a), which shows 2.2 percent for 1978-1995.
5  
Other examples can be found for the next period between the mid-1990s to the 
early and mid 2000s. An optimistic estimate of the annual TFP growth rate for this 
period can be as high as 3.9 percent (1993-2004) in Bosworth and Collins (2008) 
compared with a very pessimistic result of only 0.6 percent (1995-2001) by Zheng 
and Hu (2005) or even a negative value of -0.3 percent (1994-2000) by Cao et al. 
(2009). The estimate of 2.8 percent (1993-2005) by He and Kuijs (2007) stands in 
between the extreme results. 
Drawn on these very different findings, two conflicting views about the 
productivity performance of the Chinese economy have emerged in the debate. On 
one side, Bosworth and Collins (2008) concluded that their findings had set China 
“apart from the East Asian miracle of the 1970s and 1980s, which was more heavily 
based on investment in physical capital,” and hence suggesting that “China stands out 
for the sheer magnitude of its gains in total factor productivity (p. 53).”  On the other 
side, Young (2003) concluded that the productivity performance of China’s 
nonagricultural sector during the reform period is, while respectable, not outstanding. 
Krugman (1994) believed that China would face a limit on growth sooner or later, 
since it depended heavily on a massive increase in input with only small improvement 
in productivity, just as in the case of other Asian economies.  
How much have we learnt from this debate based on such conflicting empirical 
findings? If the findings by the “optimistic camp” are accepted, how to explain the 
contrast between such a high TFP contribution to growth in the post-reform China and 
                                                 
5 In this literature review here I concentrate on results based on the growth accounting approach. 
But there are some studies that opt for the regression approach, e.g. one by Chow and Li (2002) which 
arrives at an estimate of 3 percent for 1978-98.   4
the poor TFP performance in other East Asian economies as found by Young (1992, 
1994a, 1994b, 1995) and Kim and Lau (1994) among others, which also pursued a 
similar export-oriented development supported by government policy? Some may 
argue that China’s central planning past may be able to explain the distinction 
between China and other Asian economies. However, it is never clear that through 
what mechanism has the central planning legacy found its way to help achieve such a 
high TFP growth in China? If so, then what does the TFP mean?  
Moreover, there is ample evidence suggesting that China’s rapid economic 
growth has been subsidized or externalized in that the costs of labor, land, energy and 
environment have been substantially underpaid in a government-engineered growth 
race. While it is not difficult to understand that any underpayment of production costs 
will encourage overinvestment, hence causing inefficient use of capital that results in 
premature diminishing returns to capital, it is never clear about how such a negative 
externality of production cost can logically explain a remarkable TFP growth!  
On the other hand, if the findings by the “pessimistic camp” are correct, can we 
jump to a conclusion that China is just another example of the “East Asian miracle” 
that relied mainly, if not completely, on perspiration (working hard) and gained little 
from inspiration (working more smartly) (Krugman, 1994)? Then, where have the 
new technology, new knowledge in management and marketing, and institutions that 
have been brought by foreign direct investment gone? However, the same question 
can also be asked for other East Asian economies in their post-war industrialization.  
Then, what has gone wrong so that it results in such contradictory results and 
hence different conclusions? A proper answer is unlikely related to the methodology 
used in these studies because all adopted the standard neoclassical growth accounting 
approach. Although the relevance of the neoclassical orthodoxy in the case of China is 
highly questionable for its institutional and behavioral assumptions, it cannot help 
settle down the current debate. The only acceptable reason for the contradictory 
results is the problems in Chinese official statistics, from inconsistencies in definition 
and classification to substandard indicators influenced by the legacy of MPS (the 
material product system for national accounts under central planning) or because of 
methodological problems, and to data fabrication. Regrettably, despite over two 
decades of significant efforts in accounting growth for China, researchers still have to 
get back to such fundamental questions: how to understand deficiencies in official   5
statistics and hence the likely biases they may cause, how to choose appropriate 
approaches to tackle the problems, or how to justify the reasons for ignoring them.  
 
2. TOWARDS A “DATA FUNDAMENTALIST” APPROACH  
While getting back to the data fundamentals does not sound exciting, it is the 
only way to settle the debate with the given theoretical framework. This is what I call 
a “data fundamentalist” approach in solving the problem. It certainly does not mean 
that data issue is the only or the most important one but they are essential given that 
all the theoretical and methodological issues are in no significant controversy. A “data 
fundamentalist” approach in the growth accounting is not new. Researchers in this 
field should have remembered that there were many dedicated “data fundamentalist” 
economists whose careful studies on data and measurement issues in accounting for 
the US economy growth settled (though arguably) the intense debate about the 
productivity performance of the US economy from 1950s to 1980s (see Jorgenson, 
1990, for a comprehensive review of the contribution of the related studies).
6  
There are some principles that a “data fundamentalist” should follow in the 
growth accounting exercise. First, a targeted data problem should be fully discussed 
with necessary evidence and proper reasoning in theory and in the practice of the 
country case in question. Second, any assumption that is adopted to solve the data 
problem should be compared with its alternatives by sensitivity test. Third, data work 
for any sector of the economy must be checked in terms of accounting identity and 
intersectoral coherence in a SNA framework. Fourth, adjustment that affects growth 
rate in any given period must be empirically justified for the flow-on-stock effect in 
time (an adjustment in the growth rate will inevitably affect the related level over the 
period concerned). Fifth, if possible, any adjustment of an aggregate indicator should 
be checked by its “micro foundations” or available sub-levels of information. Last but 
not least, all kinds of data work must be made transparent and available for repeating 
the same exercise.  
Data problems have indeed been treated as a fundamental issue in some studies 
on accounting for China’s growth and productivity performance. Instead of taking 
                                                 
6 Also see other articles on this topic in the same book edited by Ernst Berndt and Jack Triplett 
(1990).   6
official data for granted or simply filling data gaps by official information, researchers 
have made significant efforts in assessing official statistics, identifying and 
acknowledging data problems, investigating the nature of the data problems, and 
proposing alternative estimates. Examples of such efforts include studies by Maddison 
(1998a), Wu (2002 and 2008a) and Maddison and Wu (2008) on output level and 
growth, Young (2003) on human capital, Woo (1998), Ren (1997) and Young (2003) 
on prices, Chow (1993), Holz (2006b and 2006c) and Wu (2008b) on investment and 
capital stock. 
There are, however, still unsolved data problems that have been an obstacle to a 
proper assessment of the Chinese economy. First, as discussed in Maddison and Wu 
(2008) there is a serious inconsistency between two official estimates of total 
employment appearing in two different tables of the same statistical yearbook, that is, 
a 17-percent jump in one estimate in 1989-90 compared with only a 1.5-percent 
increase in another estimate.
7   It is believed that this is caused by a serious 
inconsistency between population census and sample survey-based employment 
estimates and annual estimates of labor statistics based on regular statistical reports 
(Yue, 2005 and 2006). Any serious growth accounting exercise should tackle this 
problem. 
Second, the Chinese official statistics show that the labor productivity of the so-
called “non-material services” (including all non-market services, a term used in the 
MPS as “non-productive production”) grew at an astonishing rate of 6.1 percent a 
year in 1978-2008 that has never been observed in human history in normal 
situations.
8 Labor productivity growth in such services is usually very slow if not 
stagnated because of its highly labor intensive nature. However, in adjustment for the 
likely overstatement of the real growth in this sector, Maddison’s “zero labor 
                                                 
7 As discussed in Maddison and Wu (2008, p. 34), in the 2006 China Statistical Yearbook (pp. 
128 & 130), the three-sector total for 1990 (end-year) was 647.5 million whereas the actual total for the 
16 sectors was 567.4 million—a discrepancy of 80.1 million. For 2002, the discrepancy had risen to 
99.6 million. Instead of explaining it, the Yearbook disguised the discrepancy by showing the same 
“total” for the 16 sector breakdown as for the three-sector aggregate. 
8 The calculation of the official real growth rate for these “non-material” services is based on 
national accounts data including nominal value added and constant price growth rates from various 
issues of China Statistical Yearbook (for example, see NBS, 2009, pp. 42-47). The same calculation 
provides an annual growth of 1.9 percent for the pre-reform period 1952-78, which is also higher than 
the experience of many other countries.   7
productivity growth” assumption (1998 and 2007) has been hotly debated with no 
conclusion (Maddison 2006 and Holz, 2006a).  
Third, it is evident that the Chinese official statistics on the industrial value added 
have exaggerated the real growth of industrial GDP as suggested by a series of studies 
including my physical output-based production index approach (Wu, 1997 and 2002) 
that was used in Maddison and Wu (2008) and by a more recent evidence that shows 
the sum of the value added by enterprises at and above the “designated size” exceeds 
the total industrial GDP in the national accounts (Appendix A). Criticisms on my 
approach include the problem of assuming a constant input-output technology and a 
fixed ratio of gross value added to gross value of output, the typical problem of the 
Laspeyrse index number that causes consumer selection bias (see a test for the bias in 
Wu and Yue, 2000), and the likely underestimation of quality improvement that 
produces a downward bias in the approximation for the real industrial growth (Holz, 
2006a; Rawski, 2007). There has since been extended work in this area that intends to 
answer these questions (Wu, 2008b) but it has not been incorporated in a growth 
accounting exercise for China.  
There are also other measurement problems as an obstacle to the settlement of the 
China TFP performance debate including the measurement of income shares of labor 
and capital, services of labor and capital, human capital, prices of fixed assets and 
capital consumption.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3 explains why the official practice in 
estimating GDP may have introduced upward biases. Section 4 adjusts the huge break 
in 1989-90 in the official employment statistics by three scenarios. Section 5 provides 
alternative GDP estimates for “non-material services” compared with Maddison’s 
estimates based on his “zero labor productivity growth” hypothesis. Section 6 
provides time series estimates on the average years of schooling of the workforce as a 
proxy for the human capital stock. Section 7 improves my earlier physical output-
based production index for the industrial sector by introducing multiple weights and 
time-variant value added ratios. It also examines the problem of “quality change” in 
such a physical output based exercise. Section 8 estimates a new set of annual 
estimates of capital stock for the aggregate economy using alternative deflators and 
depreciation rates, crosschecked by industry level capital stock estimates. Section 9   8
reports and discusses alternative growth accounting results for the Chinese economy 
in 1952-2008. Section 10 concludes the paper. 
 
3. PROBLEMS OF THE OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF CHINA’S GDP GROWTH 
Why may MPS exaggerate growth? 
Since China’s statistical practice is still influenced by “many central planning 
legacies” (Xu, 2002a, p. 205), it is necessary to discuss the key differences between 
MPS and SNA and their implications for measuring the real GDP level and growth 
rate in a more rigorous way. Before progressing ahead, it should be noted that our 
approach is a value-added one, which constructs output from the production-side of the 
national accounts. Besides, for simplicity our discussions and mathematical expressions 
below are in real terms. 
  By the MPS standard of industrial classification, there are five material sectors in 
Chinese statistics including agriculture, industry, construction, transportation and 
telecommunication, and commerce, of which construction, transportation and 
telecommunication, and commerce are the so-call “material services”. Such grouping 
was common in the practice of all former centrally planned economies. It should be 
however noted that the material service sectors only cover the services that are used 
for production or producer services. Consumer services, e.g. passenger transportation, 
are excluded because they are considered “unproductive” in the Marxian orthodoxy.  
Perhaps contrary to the common theoretical perception, the MPS does not 
completely ignore the contribution by “non-material services”. In calculating NMP 
(net material product), the “non-material services” that are used (and hence paid) by 
the material sectors are kept together with the newly added value by “material 
production”, for example, banking or financial services, research and development, 
and legal and business consulting services. However, the rest of the “non-material 
services”, such as residential services and most of government services, is ignored in 
the national accounting practice under the MPS.
9  
                                                 
9 Taking the national accounts statistics for 1991 in nominal terms as an example (the earliest data 
available with details of 2-digit services), if assuming 100% of the value added by scientific research 
services, 70% of the value added by financial services, and 20% of the value added by all other “non-
material services” are used for producers, there would be above 60% of “non-material services” for 
consumers that were ignored under the MPS (NBS, 2001, Table 3-5).    9
As shown by the formula below, the gross value of output of “non-material 
services” 
ns







t C C C    
where for a given reporting period t, 
1 ns
t C  stands for the gross value of the “non-
material services” used (paid) by the material sectors and 
2 ns
t C  stands for the gross 
value of the rest “non-material services” used by consumers that are excluded from 
the MPS.  
Now, for all the material sectors under the MPS, let the value of material inputs 
be 
m
t C , the value of depreciation of fixed capital be
m
t D ,
10 and (net) value added from 
the material production be 
m
t V , we therefore define GMP (gross material product) for 
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t C is paid by the material sectors. Next, we can obtain the standard measure of 
the NMP by subtracting 
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Neither GMP nor NMP is compatible with the SNA concept of gross value added or 
GVA (= GDP), which includes net value added and depreciation of all productive 
activities (as defined by SNA), that is, to follow the above notations: 
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The three components on the right hand side of Eq. 4 given in brackets are: 1) gross 
valued added by the material sectors under the MPS plus the missing “material 







* ), 2) gross value added by the “non-material services” paid by the material 
                                                 
10 Strictly speaking, depreciation is one component of the income approach equation rather than 
the production or value added approach framework. However, it can also be considered part of the 
value added because some output is to compensate for capital consumption in the current period.   10
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Clearly, GMP has serious double counting because it includes the intermediate 
inputs of all the material sectors (
m
t C ). Both GMP and NMP ignore the contribution 
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double counting problem because it includes the gross value of output rather than the 
gross value added of the “non-material services” used by the material sectors (note 












). Finally, NMP seriously underestimates national income by 
ignoring capital consumption.  
The differences between MPS and SNA imply that firstly, in measuring the real 
GDP growth, GMP (as well as NMP but to a much less extent – see the double 
counting problem in the NMP measure as above discussed) tends to exaggerate the 
real GDP growth if the growth of intermediate inputs is faster than that of the value 
added. In other words, using our notations, if 
m C  grows faster than 
m V  (holding the 
growth of
m
t D  constant), the GDP/GMP ratio will decline over time and, consequently, 
GMP will have a higher growth rate than GDP. Scholarly studies have shown that this 
is indeed the case for typical centrally planned economies (e.g. see the case of the 
Soviet Union by Maddison, 1998b). Wu and Yue (2000) and Wu (2008) have also 
shown that the Chinese economy has experienced a declining value added ratio over 
time.  
Secondly, if the excluded “non-material services” tends to grow less rapidly 
compared with the rest of the economy, especially manufacturing, which is widely 
observed at the earlier stages of economic development in general and in centrally 
planned economy in particular that tends to sacrifice services, the real growth rate will 
also be exaggerated.  
Criticisms on the Chinese official GDP estimates 
Prior to 1992, China’s statistical authorities used the Soviet MPS which included 
double counting and excluded a large part of service activity, therefore systematically   11
overstated growth. There were also serious deficiencies in the basic reporting system. 
Scholarly work has suggested that official estimates underestimate GDP level while 
overestimating GDP growth. As various studies have suggested, the underestimation of 
GDP level was due to the undercoverage effect due to the nature of MPS (see the 
previous section) and the price distortion effect attributed to government industrial 
policy under central planning, whereas the overestimation of GDP growth was because 
of underdeflation of prices while overreporting of output (see Keidel, 1992; Rawski, 
1993; World Bank, 1994; Woo, 1996; Maddison, 1998a; Wu, 1997, 2000 and 2002).  
As discussed in Wu (2000, pp. 479-480), China’s long practice of the Soviet-type 
“comparable price” approach
11 underestimates inflation because it requires enterprises 
to report their output at some “constant prices” provided in a price manual specifying 
2000 items that was set ten years ago, which tends to create some “substitution bias” 
especially since China’s price reforms.
12 It also tended to ignore the new products 
subsequently emerged after the benchmark year. Since new products could be over-
priced in the absence of reference products, this created leeway for enterprises to 
exaggerate their real output by categorizing more products as new products and 
specifying their market prices to be the same as or close to their “constant prices” that 
were not provided in the price manual. (See Appendix B for a further elaboration of 
the price problem.) 
Institutionally, heavy government intervention in business decision making and 
the administratively managed data reporting system induced distorted incentives for 
firms and local officials to exaggerate their growth performance. Reports at the basic 
level reach NBS through several levels of aggregation in the administrative hierarchy. 
                                                 
11 China’s statistical authorities applied the “comparable price” approach mainly to the traditional 
“material” sectors such as agriculture, industry and “material services” such as transportation and post-
telecommunication. There have been five sets of “constant prices” that were used for constructing real 
output at “comparable prices”, namely, 1952, 1957, 1970, 1980 and 1990 “constant prices” (see SSB, 
1997, p. 73; Xu and Gu, 1997, pp. 5-12). Traditionally, only state enterprises and collective enterprises 
at or above the township level (re-defined as designated size after 1998) were required to make regular 
report on their output at both “comparable” and current prices as required by this system. The “1990 
constant prices” were used till 2002. Afterwards, the prices of the previous year constant-price output 
were used as the constant prices for the current year output, but this new approach has not been 
explicitly explained by NBS.  
12 In a market system, commodities whose prices increase more rapidly turn to be substituted by 
commodities whose prices increase less rapidly or decline. If prices are fixed over a period that is long 
enough to experience significant price changes, the constant price measure will turn to exaggerate 
growth after the benchmark year. In the Chinese case, prices have changed or been corrected by the 
market-oriented reforms especially since the 1990s, yet the official “1990 constant prices” (as part of 
the long-practiced “comparable price system” developed under MPS) were in use till 2002.    12
This transmission train provides opportunities for officials at different levels to adjust 
their reports to reflect favorably on their management. NBS makes crosschecks, but 
they are necessarily limited in scope.  
These problems justify using available volume movements to gauge the real 
growth since it can bypass the official problematic price measures as well as the 
upward bias due to the institutional problem. However, in the current practice except 
for two sectors (agriculture and transport), growth measures are not checked or 
revised based on quantitative indicators of volume movement. 
  There have been a number of important studies attempting to make alternative 
estimates using various approaches, such as physical output index (Wu, 2002a), 
alternative price indices (Jefferson et al., 1996; Ren, 1997; Woo, 1998; Young, 2003), 
and energy consumption approximation (Adams and Chen, 1996; Rawski, 2001). 
Despite different results, all appear to be supportive to the upward bias hypothesis for 
the official data. Rawski (2001) concentrated on the performance in the 1990s and 
was very critical of the official measure for 1997-98 which reflected “government 
objectives rather than economic outcomes”. In fact, estimates for 1997-98 by Wu 
(2008) and Maddison and Wu (2008) indeed show the same discrepancy from the 
official measure. Shiau (2004) re-estimated growth using the expenditure approach 
and found significantly slower performance than the official measure for 1978-2000. 
Keidel (2001) also made estimates of GDP growth from the expenditure side for 
1979-2000 which show substantial annual divergence from the official measure by 
industry of origin. His main motivation was to cross-check annual movement of the 
official figures rather than comment on longer term growth.
13 
 
4. A NEW ESTIMATION OF CHINESE EMPLOYMENT  
China’s official data on employment not only have conceptual problems (see Wu, 
2002b) but also suffer from structural breaks. Specifically, the official total number of 
employment jumped from 553.3 million in 1989 to 647.5 million in 1990, suggesting 
an astonishing 17 percent or 94.2 million increase in one year (Table A3)! This new 
                                                 
13 There is also a very useful recent evaluation of the literature on official national accounts in the 
volume edited by Dev Pant (2007) for the Asian Development Bank, which also supports the views by 
the earlier studies.   13
total is available with three sector breakdowns (primary, secondary and tertiary) 
linking to the same breakdowns prior to 1990, but not with estimates at industry level. 
However, the existing industry level estimates, which follow the pre-1990 tradition, 
suggest an 80.1 million shortage in the total compared with the new estimate in 1990. 
The post-1990 data series is then built on this new level of total employment, hence 
creating a continuous gap with the underlying trend if based on the pre-1990 data 
series. When the traditional industry level estimation was discontinued in 2002, the 
gap rose to 99.6 million (NBS, 2009, Table 4-5). Two decades have passed since the 
gap first emerged, yet there has been neither explanation nor adjustment for the 
inconsistency by the statistical authority. This has been a serious obstacle to a proper 
measure of both the level and growth of labor productivity in China. 
In this section I adjust the 1989-90 employment data break by investigating the 
nature of the break and examining the fundamental forces that might affect the 
demand and supply of labor at the time when the break appeared. Meanwhile, I 
integrate the adjustment with a new work on estimation of missing military personnel 
in “non-material services” prior to 1990 – a factor that played an important role in 
Maddison’s value added estimates for such services (Maddison, 1998a and 2007).  
Adjustment to the 1989-90 Break 
A quick look at the 1989-90 structural break against the background of labor 
supply and macroeconomic situation gives an impression that the break is rather 
artificial. On the one hand, the change of working-age population around that time 
was stable, i.e. no any significant deviation from the trend, and on the other hand, it 
was impossible for the demand for labor to have any above normal increase in the 
middle of a serious growth slowdown – by official statistics the growth of GDP 
dropped to 3.3 percent in 1989 and stayed at around a similar rate (3.2) in 1990 from 
10.5 percent in 1988, which was the slowest growth since the reform (Table A6).  
As discussed in Yue (2005), the gap is caused by inappropriately liking the 
results of the 1990 Population Census to the annual estimates that is based on a 
regular employment registration and reporting system. The population census 
discovered a large numbers employed who had been missed by the regular reporting 
system, yet the NBS was not able to integrate the results with the annual estimates at 
industry level. Nonetheless, without any good reason to ignore the census results,   14
between 1990 and 2002 the NBS continued its census-based estimation for total 
employment supported by annual population sample surveys and published the results 
in parallel to annual industry level estimates in a way that disguised the huge 
underlying inconsistency between the reported totals and the implicit sum of 
industries.  
If this 1990 Census-discovered additional workforce (i.e. 80.1 millions in 1990) 
did not appear suddenly in 1990, which is a reasonable assumption, a logical inquiry 
should be whether it had always existed in the economy but never covered by the 
labor statistical system or it began from a certain period when policy or institutional 
changes allowed some new types of employment to emerge but not picked up by the 
registration system. A proper investigation should be conducted on two grounds: 
checking earlier or pre-1990 population censuses or sample surveys and examining 
employment policy changes.  
China only conducted three population censuses before the 1990 Census, namely 
1953, 1964 and 1982. Unfortunately, the available data from the 1953 and 1964 
censuses do not contain employment information. However, the 1982 Population 
Census reports China’s total number of employment as 521.5 millions, or 68.6 
millions more than the annual estimate of 452.9 millions for that year. Additional 
information from the 1987 one-percent population sample survey gives an estimate of 
584.6 millions or 56.7 millions more than the annual estimate of 527.8 millions (see 
Tables A2 and A3). It is clearer now that the structural break at least started in 1982 
rather than in 1990.  
My next question is when this additional employment began to exist. There has 
been ample research suggesting that the government began relax its employment 
regulation in the early 1970s to give room to the development of rural (then commune 
and brigade) enterprises and to allow “outside plan” hiring in cities (Wu, 1994). 
However, new jobs were created in an informal way and many of the new workers 
were temporal and seasonal in nature and could be engaged in multiple jobs, hence 
they were insufficiently covered by the reporting system. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the discrepancy began in the early 1970s.  
In my alternative adjustment scenarios, the two above effects are separately or 
jointly considered. Before proceeding further, the official employment estimates have   15
to be revised by taking into account the results from the 1982 Population Census and 
the 1987 Population Sample Survey. I use the total numbers of employment for 1982 
and 1987 (sample survey results are multiplied by 100) as the control totals for the 
two years and use the annual movements between the benchmarks of 1982, 1987 and 
1990 to construct a series of control totals between the benchmarks. Consequently, 
and not surprisingly, the 1990 break is pushed back to 1982 and results in 19.3 percent 
in 1982. The revised estimates are reported in Table A2 (referring figures from 1982-
89, which may be compared with original official estimates for the same period in 
Table A3).
14 I then propose three scenarios for adjusting the 1982 employment data 
break.  
Scenario 1: The adjustment under this scenario uses a simple smoothing 
procedure to the problem. It assumes that the employment growth in 1982 follows a 
linear trend between 1981 and 1983, or 2.9 percent (i.e. an average of 1981 and 1982 
growth rates, 3.2 and 2.7 percent, respectively) instead of 19.3 percent. This lifts up 
the level of employment from 1981 back to 1949, yet maintaining the original official 
growth rates of that period. As a result, the total employment is raised by 69.3 
millions to 506.6 millions in 1981. In the case of 1949, the total employment is raised 
by 28.7 millions to 209.5 millions. This scenario assumes that all the employment 
data prior to the 1982 population census are underestimated to the same extent as 
suggested by the 1982 break. It is the employment reporting system rather than the 
change of employment policy that underestimated the total numbers of employment. 
Scenario 2: This scenario assumes that the “gap” identified by the 1982 census 
began only from the early 1970s (set it from 1971) when the government began to 
relax its control over employment especially in rural areas. In the adjustment, the 
growth rate between 1981 and 1982 is set as 2.9 percent, which is the same as in 
Scenario 1, to raise the level of employment in 1981, then the annual deviation from 
the original growth trend in 1970-82 is applied to a new trend over the same period, 
                                                 
14 The adjustment is made at sector level, including four sectors, namely, agriculture, industry, 
construction and services. Only the 1982 Census provides sectoral and industry level employment data. 
However, the number of agricultural employment in the 1982 Census (384.2 million) looks too high – 
almost the same as that of the 1990 Census (389.1). Its share in the total employment is 74 percent, 
which is much higher than what suggested by the reporting system (68 percent). This is unreasonable 
given that the Census is supposed to pick up more non-agricultural employment that is not covered by 
the reporting system. I then reduce the agricultural employment by 10 percent and reallocate the 
difference to other sectors by existing weights. The results look plausible with agriculture accounting 
for 66.3 percent, industry 18 percent, construction 2.2 percent, and services 13.5 percent.    16
which adds additional employment to each year of the period. The so-added number 
of employment for 1971-81, which is 69.3 million for 1981 but 4.8 million for 1971, 
is allocated to each sector as in the case of Scenario 1.  
Scenario 3: For the level adjustment this scenario is the same as in Scenario 2. 
However, instead of allocating the additional employment into each sector according 
to the existing structure of the economy, it approach assumes that more of the 
additional employment is engaged in labor intensive non-farming activities. Based on 
this assumption, the amount of the additional employment that is allocated to the farm 
sector is assumed only 60 percent of its existing share in the total employment and the 
rest of the additional employment is allocated to the industrial and the “material 
services” sectors. The “non-material” services are excluded in this adjustment simply 
because the additional laborers are least-educated hence unlikely to engage in 
financial, governmental, healthcare and education services.
15 The full results are based 
on this scenario and reported Table A2 (Appendix). 
TABLE 1 
CHINESE EMPLOYMENT DATA ADJUSTED FOR THE 1989-90 STRUCTURAL BREAK:  
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL STATISTICS  












1949-50  5.6 5.6 5.6 5.1 5.1 
      
1969-70  3.0 3.6 3.6 3.9 3.9 
1970-71  2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.2 
1971-72  2.5 0.7 0.7 2.0 3.4 
      
1980-81  2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 4.5 
1981-82  3.1  3.6 19.3 3.1  3.8 
1982-83  3.2 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.8 
      
1988-89  2.0 1.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 
1989-90  1.8  17.0  3.3 3.4 3.4 
1990-91  1.5 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.2 
Sources:  Data for working-age population and official employment are from NBS (2009). See 
the text for the distinction of two NBS series and explanation for the three scenarios. 
Official statistics refer to end-year numbers whereas the adjusted data are in mid-year 
estimates. For a comparison with the NBS estimates the adjusted data do not include 
military personnel. The complete adjusted (including military personnel) and official 
employment estimates are reported in Tables A2 and A3, respectively.  
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, the census-discovered additional employment should be adjusted by part-time 
hours and allocate these hours into the most labor-intensive manufacturing industries and services 
based on industry level information, which is being conducted in another research project. However, 
ignoring this fact will not change the current results as they are for the aggregate economy and its broad 
sectors.    17
  
Table 1 shows the alternative adjustments to the official employment statistics for 
selected time points that are used as benchmarks and their adjacent years. All the 
estimates refer to the aggregate economy. The annual growth rate of the working age 
population for these time points is also included to show the potential supply of labor. 
The NBS revised estimates show the effect of the 1982 Census-based revision that 
shifts the break backward from 1989-90 to 1981-82. The results of the three scenarios 
are shown from 1981-82 backward (note that Scenarios 2 and 3 are the same at the 
aggregate level). Scenarios 2 and 3 have significantly raised the annual growth rate in 
the period 1970-81 as shown by the three benchmarks and they look plausible 
considering the changes of the working-age population. Note that differences between 
my estimates and the NBS estimates in other benchmark years are the effects of my 
adjustment that changes from end-year to mid-year employment.  
Adjustment to “Non-material Services” 
My adjustment to the “non-material” service employment is motivated by 
Maddison’s earlier work (1998a) to include military personnel into the non-material 
services as a standard practice in national accounts for labor employment. As argued 
by Maddison, the exclusion of military personnel may significantly lowered the 
service output estimation especially for the earlier period when the military 
employment was high after the war and engaged in many economic activities.
16 
Because of lack of information, Maddison added a fixed 3 millions of army personnel 
to each year’s “non-material service” employment.
17  
My new work is based on a more careful and detailed information gathering (well 
documented in Appendix C, Table A1). It begins with reconciliation between two sets 
of employment statistics: the one categorized as “material” and “non-material” and 
the other classified into major economic sectors. The categorization of “material” and 
“non-material” employment is just like the official output statistics under the MPS. 
This practice stopped after 1993, but enough for our purpose because the adjustment 
                                                 
16 Apart from defense service, military personnel also engaged in construction, transportation, 
farming and government services in the early period of the People’s Republic. Assuming they only 
engaged in “non-material (and non-market) services” may exaggerate the input and output of these 
services, but it will not affect aggregate analysis.  
17 Maddison did not change this strong assumption based estimation in the later revision of his 
work on China’s growth performance (2007), which was also maintained in Maddison and Wu (2008).   18
only focuses on the period prior to the early 1990s. This reconciliation ensures the 
compatibility of the two employment series over time, and hence ensuring the 
consistency of the employment of the “non-material services” where military 
personnel belong to. 
The available evidence shows that China’s military personnel were not included 
before 1990. By the time when they were counted into the official employment 
statistics in 1990 there were about 3 million military personnel in service. However, 
the missing military personnel prior to 1990 were not a constant of 3 million over time 
as Maddison assumed. China’s armed forces were numbered at about 5.5 million in 
1949. After four rounds of demobilization between 1950 and 1956, the number 
reduced to 2.4 million by the end of 1958. It, however, rose again from the mid 1960s 
to the mid 1970s because of the bounder tension and conflict with Soviet Union and 
India. By the end of 1975 it increased to 6.8 million which was the highest in the post-
war era. Two new rounds of demobilization were conducted in the post-Mao period 
promoted by Deng who aimed at maintaining smaller but more modernized armed 
forces at around 3 million from the end of the 1980s (see Appendix C for details).  
The effect of adding the newly estimated military personnel to the existing “non-
material services” employment is much stronger for the earlier period than for the 
later period. After the adjustment, the military personnel accounted 67 percent of the 
“non-material service” employment in 1949, 27 percent in 1975 and only 5 percent in 
1989. This implies that any employment-based level estimation for the earlier period, 
such as value added based on labor compensation, will be substantially raised and the 
growth rate will be significantly reduced. For example, compared with Maddison’s 
estimate of 6.3 percent annual growth in “non-material service” employment in 1952-
1962, my estimate is only 4.5 percent.  
 
5. AN ADJUSTMENT FOR THE GROWTH OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
There has not been sufficient work in this area of research for China due to 
limited data. Studies using industry data estimate human capital input through 
changes of labor composition weighted by a labor compensation matrix (see Cao et al, 
2009; Wu and Yue, 2010). This kind of studies relies on population census and 
sample survey data. Since the available censuses and surveys are limited in number   19
and not designed for proper cross-classification by human capital and demographic 
attributes and do not include labor compensation data, a Mincer type of earnings 
regression is often used to estimate quality change of labor. It is even more difficult to 
extend such a study back to the pre-reform period and to cover the whole economy.  
In order to capture the human capital effect on output growth over such a long 
period, this study follows a school of researchers who rely on a measure of education 
attainment as a proxy for human capital input. Data on education attainment are 
relatively easy to obtain. There are two sets of education data that are available in the 
annual Chinese statistics, i.e. numbers enrolled and numbers graduated per annum by 
level of education. Because of limited information on annual drop off and repeat rates 
as well as the breakdown of the education system due to political reasons (the decade 
long Cultural Revolution as an extreme case), which affect the average schooling 
cycle of each education level, I therefore prefer the use of graduation data to the use 
of enrollment data.  
The annual number of graduates at different levels of education, after a proper 
adjustment, reflects the newly increased human capital through education that is 
added to the existing human capital stock. However, it should be noted that the 
existing human capital stock also contains the knowledge accumulated through on-job 
training and work experience. Due to little information a human capital measure based 
on education implicitly assumes, rather strongly, that it fully represents the ability of 
human capital accumulation through work related training and experience.  
I adopt a working hypothesis that the average schooling of the working age 
population was 1.7 years for 1950, which is the same as Madison’s estimate for 1950 
but much higher than Wang and Yao (2002)’s estimate of 0.9 years. Maddison used 
the enrollment data, which might exaggerate the actual annual increase in educated 
human capital, whereas Wang and Yao used the graduation data. However, to 
estimate the initial stock for China, Wang and Yao applied the Indian schooling 
structure in 1960 from Barro and Lee (1997 and 2000), which might underestimate 
the average years of schooling in China.  
Next, I convert annual graduates of different education levels into a measure that 
is primary schooling-equivalent using arbitrarily assigned impact factors as in 
Maddison (see notes to Table 2) with an adjustment. That is, the number of graduates   20
at each level is multiplied by its standard years of schooling (see notes to Table 2) and 
then by its impact factor. For graduates of any level of education only the current 
level of (not accumulated) years of schooling is counted to avoid double counting.  
To set up the initial stock, I first assume the knowledge learnt through school 
education depreciates by a constant rate of 1 percent a year, which means that about 
25 percent of the knowledge will be lost or obsolete 30 years after graduation from 
high school (at this level it is equivalent to 14.25 years of primary schooling). It 
follows that given the assumed average years of schooling for 1950 and the size of 
working-age population, the initial human capital stock is 500 million years of 
primary school-equivalent education prior to 1950. This is comparable to the total 
education output (508.8 million years of primary school-equivalent) between 1950 
and 1965 after taking the knowledge depreciation into account, which is plausible 
given that the modern school system had only existed in China for about a half a 
century
18 in which there were four decades that were heavily affected by nation-wide 
wars, hence interrupting education and industrialization.
19,20  
                                                 
18 The beginning of the modern school system in China could arguably be dated back to as early 
as 1861 when China’s self-strengthening movement (yangwu yundong) started.  
19 Thanks to Marcel Timmer’s suggestion that a life-table approach using population census data 
may be used to backward estimate the initial human capital stock in the early 1950s. The quality of the 
available Chinese population censuses and the possibility of applying the life-table approach will be 
explored to improve the present study.  
20 Another approach to estimate the initial human capital stock is to assume the annual growth of 
(primary equivalent) graduation between 1900 and 1949 is the same as that in 1949-52. However, the 
difficulty is how to take the shocks due to regime change and war damages into account when 
justifying the plausibility of the results.    21
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATED AVERAGE YEARS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL-EQUIVALENT SCHOOLING PER 
























































Initial value    500         
1950 6  501  298.2  1.68  190.6  2.63 
1960 52  728  377.3  1.93  262.8  2.77 
1973 139  1,671  497.0 3.36  375.7  4.45 
1978 233  2,595  560.4 4.63  426.3  6.09 
1992 173  4,613  785.1 5.88  661.2  6.98 
1999 225  5,616  851.6 6.60  712.9  7.88 
2008 271  7,340  966.8 7.59  774.7  9.47 
Sources: Basic graduation data are from NBS (2009 and earlier volumes). 
Notes: 1) Most of the reference years are selected to match Maddison (1998a, Table 3.8) and Wang and 
Yao (2002, Appendix Table). 2) The standard schooling is 6 years for primary, 3 for junior secondary, 
3 for senior secondary, 4 for tertiary (including polytechnic institutions), 3 for vocational school and 10 
for special school. To convert all levels of education into a primary schooling equivalent standard, 
which is equal to one, the impact factor is set up as 1.25 for junior secondary, 1.5 for senior secondary, 
2 for tertiary education, 1.5 for vocational schools and 1.5 for special schools. See similar set up in 
Maddison (1998a, Table 3.8). 
 
As shown in Table 2, using the working-age population as the denominator my 
results show a 3.7 percent of annual growth rate of the educated human capital stock 
for the pre-reform period and 1.7 percent for the post-reform period (with 1978 as the 
reform benchmark). My results give a slower growth rate than those by Maddison 
(1998a) and Wang and Yao (2002). Referring to the same reference years as in 
Maddison and in Wang and Yao, between 1950 and 1973, my results suggest that the 
average years of school increased from 1.68 to 3.36 per person or grew by 3.1 percent 
per annum compared with 0.91 to 2.51 years per person or grew by 4.9 percent per 
annum in Wang and Yao (2002) and 1.60 to 4.09 years or grew by 4.2 percent per 
annum in Maddison (1998a). By 1992, my estimates show that the average years of 
schooling increased to 5.88 compared with 8.50 years per person in Maddison and 
5.29 years in Wang and Yao. In the period 1973-92, I show an annual growth of 3 
percent whereas the growth rate by Maddison is 4.1 percent and by Wang and Yao is 
4.5 percent.   22
To compensate for the missing information on human capital through on-job 
training and work experience, I further assume that all educated human capital is used 
by the workforce as shown in the last column of Table 2. This is not less reasonable if 
we assumed that an educated working-age person is more likely to be employed. In 
doing so, since the effect of any type of withdrawal from the workforce is already 
taken into account, I do not have to account for the age specific mortality of the 
working-age population (implicitly I assume the age specific mortality rate of the 
working-age population is the same as in the workforce). Therefore, my estimated 
average years of schooling are not fully compatible with those by Maddison (1998a) 
and Wang and Yao (2002). See Table A4-1 and A4-2 for the full estimated results. 
 
6. ESTIMATION OF VALUE-ADDED BY “NON-MATERIAL” SERVICES 
In this section, we discuss how the new results are used in the exercise of 
estimating value added for the “non-material (including non-market)” sector based on 
Maddison’s “zero labor productivity change” assumption and its alternatives proposed 
in the study. 
Based on the labor intensive nature of “non-material” services and evidence of nil 
or very slow labor productivity growth in the OECD countries (van Ark, 1996, p. 109-
115), Maddison argued that the official estimate of gross value added (i.e. GDP) for 
this sector was implausible because it implied an abnormally high labor productivity 
growth in such service activities. He showed that the official estimate of GDP growth 
by “non-material” services was 11 percent per annum for the reform period 1978-
2003 (Maddison, 2007a, Table C.6). Together with the relevant official employment 
data, this means that this sector’s labor productivity growth would be at 4.2 percent 
per annum, which appeared to be too high to be true. It is very likely due to 
insufficient measure of price changes that exaggerated GDP growth, which has been a 
long problem in China, particularly in services.
21  
Drawn from the experience of economic history, Maddison used a “zero labor 
productivity change” assumption in his estimation for China’s “non-material” service 
value added, which meant that the value added would grow along with the growth of 
                                                 
21  The wage increase of service employees has been much slower than the price increase of 
services. However, the NBS estimates of the value added in services are based on the income approach.   23
the employment in this sector. He arrived at an annual value added growth of 5.5 
percent in 1978-2003, just a half of the official estimate of 11 percent (10.9 for 1978-
2008, Table 3). The impact of this adjustment on China’s total GDP growth is about 
0.9 percentage points.
22 Consequently, the TFP will be affected by this adjustment but 
only slightly, ceteris paribus.  
In this study Maddison’s results are revised using my new employment estimates 
for this sector as discussed in the earlier section. As shown in Table 3, my revision 
has a slightly downward effect on his original estimate. Both the original and revised 
Maddison estimates are presented in the table and are compared with the official 
estimates. 
Maddison’s “zero labor productivity” assumption has been challenged by some 
researchers (see Holz, 2006a) who argued that higher GDP growth for this sector is 
possible. Maddison’s rebuttal to Holz (Maddison, 2006) is justifiable at least for the 
pre-reform period. The official data as presented in Maddison (Table C.6, 2007a) 
show that there was virtually no labor productivity growth in this sector on average 
between the early 1950s and the early 1980s. However, there is room to improve 
Maddison’s adjustment by incorporating annual labor productivity movements around 
the trend (deviation from the trend) as observed in the official data even if the trend 
has a zero growth. This adjustment is introduced to the pre-reform period in my two 
alternative estimates in this study. For the reform period, which is redefined for my 
adjustment as beginning in 1982 when labor productivity started to rise, I assume that 
it increased by one percent per annum throughout the period 1982-2008 (Alternative I, 
Table 3). To test how sensitive if this assumption is changed, I further raise the annual 
labor productivity growth to two percent from 1993 (Alternative II, Table 3) when 
China adopted the “socialist market economy” policy that deepened the reform and 
hence speeded up the restructuring of the economy. This assumption may be too 
strong if not outrageous because a faster growth of “non-material services” following 
the reform-induced marketization does not necessarily mean an increase in labor 
productivity in those services. Economic history shows that a transition towards 
services will lead to a decline in productivity in general. 
                                                 
22 This impact measure is obtained based on the average share of this “non-material” service 
sector in the nominal GDP for this period which is 16.8 percent.   24
TABLE 3 
GROWTH OF VALUE ADDED BY “NON-MATERIAL” SERVICES IN CHINA:  
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL ESTIMATES 












1952-57 9.5 5.5 3.0 3.4 3.4 
1957-65 7.1 4.4 5.2 6.7 6.7 
1965-71 2.0 1.2 2.0 0.7 0.7 
1971-78 4.8 5.1 4.6 3.2 3.2 
1952-78 5.7 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.7 
      
1978-84  11.9 6.6 6.4 9.8 9.8 
1984-91  10.5 5.5 5.8 3.3 3.3 
1991-01  10.3 5.0 6.3 8.4 9.3 
2001-08  11.8 4.0 3.2 4.6 5.7 
1978-08 11.0  5.5  5.5 6.6 7.1 
Sources: Official output and employment data used for the estimation are from China 
Statistical Year 2009 and earlier issues. Official output data prior to 1978 are from 
Maddison (2007). See Maddison (1998 and 2007) for his approach and original results.  
Notes: Revised Maddison estimates are based on the new employment estimates of “non-
material” services in this study. See text for alternative assumptions. Annual growth rate 
is calculated as arithmetic average of log differences. *The period covered by the original 
Maddison results is 1952-2003. **The alternative adjustments cover the period from 
1982 onwards because official data show the labor productivity of “non-material 
services” only started to rise in 1982. 
 
My two alternative estimates (I and II) in Table 3 show higher volatility in the 
planning period with an overall downward effect on Maddison’s original results by 
0.6 percentage points. Greater volatilities are also observed in the reform period when 
the alternative assumptions are introduced. They both give a higher growth rate than 
Maddison’s earlier estimates for the reform period as a whole but slower growth for 
the planning period. The impact of the two alternative adjustments on the real GDP 
growth rate in the reform period (not shown in Table 3) is a downward effect of 0.78 
percentage points with Alternative I and 0.70 percentage points by Alternative II 
compared with 0.93 by Maddison’s original result (adjusted for annual movements). 
The full results are presented in Table A5 which can be compared with the official 
GDP estimates in Table A6. 
 
7. A REVISION OF THE WU INDEX FOR CHINESE INDUSTRIAL VALUE ADDED 
Earlier studies proposed the upward bias hypothesis against the official 
estimation for Chinese industrial growth including Adams and Chen (1996), Keidel   25
(1992 and 2001), Maddison (1998a), Ren (1997), Woo (1998) and Rawski (1993 and 
2001). This hypothesis has been supported by various empirical studies, especially by 
my own work (Wu, 1997 and 2002a) using the physical output of major industrial 
products or product groups weighted by the input-output table value added weights 
for 1987 (implying 1987 constant prices). My earlier estimates for 1952-1995 (Wu, 
1997) were incorporated in Maddison’s re-estimation of China’s post-war GDP 
growth (1998a). In 2002, I further improved the estimates by increasing the number of 
products and by introducing intra-industry value weights using detailed commodity 
price data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
23  A preliminarily simple 
update of my industrial index was reported in Wu (2007). A refined version of the 
results was adopted in Maddison (2007a) and Maddison and Wu (2008). The update 
suggests that the official estimate of China’s industrial GDP growth may have been 
overestimated by 1.75 percentage points for the period 1978-2003, i.e. the official 
estimate of 11.50 percent per annum compared to my estimate of 9.75 percent per 
annum. For the pre-reform period 1952-78, the official estimate may have been 
exaggerated by 1.32 percentage points, i.e. 11.46 percent per annum compared to my 
estimate of 10.14 percent per annum. For the period 1952-2003 covered by Maddison 
and Wu (2008), if only the NBS industrial GDP estimates are replaced by my 
estimates, the impact on the NBS estimate of GDP growth rate is –0.8 percent per 
annum for the post-reform period and +0.1 percent per annum for the pre-reform 
period.
24 
My quantity output index approach is not unchallenged. A challenge has come 
from Holz (2006a).
25  However, his challenge missed the right target or the main 
deficiency of the approach and ignored the likely bias in the results that are in fact 
already warned in Wu (2002a). Instead, not only did he carry on the problem of the 
approach but also simplified it by applying it to a cross country case, meanwhile 
completely ignored the underlying classical index number problems. As we show in 
                                                 
23 The industrial classification follows the 1987 input-output table. The intra-industry structure is 
identified by industry specific almanacs published by relevant national industrial associations together 
with the commodity price data. 
24 Readers can work out the impact of the Maddison-Wu sectoral adjustment on the GDP growth 
using the data provided in the paper (2008). 
25 See Maddison’s rebuttal to Holz in the same issue of the Review of Income and Wealth (2006) 
where Holz’s paper is published. However, the key issues discussed in this study were not sufficiently 
discussed in Maddison’s short reply.   26
this study, Holz’s oversimplified work implies neither the official estimates of 
industrial growth rate are flawless
26 nor my estimates are implausible.  
In Maddison and Wu (2008), we recapped two likely biases in my earlier 
estimates though we did not tackle them. The first one is the strong assumption that 
value added ratio or the ratio of gross value added (GDP) to gross value of output 
(=GVA/GVO) in the 1987 input-output table remained unchanged. However, if the 
ratio has increased over time, growth would be underestimated; if it declined, growth 
would be exaggerated. Based on data on net material product (NMP), Wu and Yue 
(2000) already show that for the industrial sector as a whole the ratio remained stable 
before the mid-1980s but declined afterwards (p.92, Table 2). However, more detailed 
information from China’s input-output tables suggests that the ratio declined generally 
over the entire post-reform period. In 1987, the ratio was 0.32 if measured by the 
NMP approach as in Wu and Yue (2000) or 0.31 by the value added approach (Wu, 
2002a, p. 193). It declined to 29 in 1995 (Wu, 2002a, p.193) and had maintained at 
about this level by 2002 (28 in 2000, NBS, 2004, pp. 71-73; 30 in 2002, DNA, 2006, 
pp. 84-89). The ratio experienced a further decline along with a new wave of export-
oriented growth following China’s WTO entry at the end of 2001. By 2007, it 
dropped to 23 according to China’s 2007 Input-Output Table. Therefore, my earlier 
estimates using the 1987 benchmark may have still exaggerated China’s real GDP 
growth for the post-reform period.  
A second potential problem is the so-called substitution bias that is also well 
known as the Gerschenkron effect (1951). The demand theory suggests that if 
consumers are rational, changes in prices are negatively correlated with changes in 
quantities demanded. A quantity index based on prices after the base year would fall 
short of an index using the base-year prices. In other words, the fixed-weight quantity 
index will overstate growth rate for the years after the benchmark and understate the 
earlier growth before the benchmark. In a preliminary exercise in Wu and Yue (2000) 
showed that if the benchmark were changed from 1987 to 1992, using the 1992 input-
output table weights while keeping all others unchanged, China’s industrial growth 
rate would be further lowered by about 1 percent per annum for the period 1978-97, 
                                                 
26 However, in his recent short article, Holz changed his view and argued that, yet with little 
empirical support, the growth estimates by local governments were more reliable and closer to the true 
growth rate than the work by NBS (Holz, 2008).    27
yet raised by 0.1 percent for the period 1952-78. Apparently due to the price controls 
under central planning, the Gerschenkron effect appears to be evident only in the post-
reform period. 
In the present study, with an updated and revised commodity series covering the 
entire period 1949-2008 I first construct three GVO series by industry (4 mining, 19 
manufacturing and 1 utilities) using the 1987, 1992 and 1997 input-output table 
weights, respectively. The results show a clear Gerschenkron effect for the period 
beginning in 1980 and in 1993 in particular. Taking the industrial sector as a whole 
for the period 1993-2008 as an example, the so-estimated annual GVO growth rate 
reduced from 15.3 percent based on the 1987 weights, to 14.1 percent based on the 
1992 weights and further to 12.0 if the 1997 weights are used. For the period 1980-
1993 the Gerschenkron effect is also downward but by 0.6-0.7 percentage points only. 
As for the period 1949-80, there is only a trivial upward effect if changed from the 
1987 to the 1992 weights, but it becomes downward by 0.3 percentage points if the 
1997 weights are used.  
Next, to derive the GVA series by industry, I multiply each of the constructed 
GVO series by the input-output table value added ratios (GVA/GVO) interpolated 
between benchmarks starting from 1987 when the first Chinese SNA input-output 
table became available and extrapolated backward from 1987 to 1949 based on the 
series of the NMP ratio constructed in Wu and Yue (2000). Taking the total industry 
in the period 1993-2008 as an example, this value added ratio-based adjustment gives 
an estimate of the annual industrial GVA growth at 12.4 percent if using the 1987 
weights, 11.4 percent if using the 1992 weights and 9.5 percent if using the 1997 
weights. This means that the adjustment has a substantial downward Gerschenkron 
effect for this period ranging from 2.5 to 2.9 percentage points by different weights. 
For the period 1980-1993, it is even stronger ranging 2.9 to 3.3 percentage points. As 
for the period prior to 1980, it reveals an upward effect of about one percentage point 
no matter which benchmark weights are used.
27  
                                                 
27  One problem in this type of value added adjustment is that it implicitly applies a single 
deflation approach, i.e. deflating GVO and GVA by the same deflator. It cannot be easily improved 
because the volume movement approach has bypassed the effect of price changes.   28
FIGURE 1 
CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL VALUE ADDED GROWTH: OFFICIAL VERSUS ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES 































































































































Sources: In constructing the alternative industrial GVA index, commodity data are from DIS (2009) 
and DITS (2008 and earlier volumes), price data are from a Hitotsubashi University price database 
(IER, 1999), and the benchmark year (1987, 1992 and 1997) weights are from Chinese input-output 
tables. Chinese industrial GDP data are from NBS (2009 and earlier volumes). 
 
Finally, I construct a single industrial GVA index by linking the three aggregate 
industrial GVA indices into one series. Figure 1 presents the annual growth of my 
alternative Chinese industrial GVA in comparison with that of NBS. This new 
exercise has further confirmed my previous findings (Wu, 2002a; Maddison and Wu, 
2008) with a slower but more volatile industrial growth for the post-reform period. 
Interestingly, for most of the recessions (negative growth) or significant downturns 
my commodity-based alternative estimates show a worse situation than what reported 
by the official statistics. Moreover, my results show the industrial growth was indeed 
negative at the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 as hypothesized by Rawski 
(2001), which resulted in a negative growth in the aggregate GDP (Table A6). My 
results have confirmed some of the earlier hypotheses that the overheating in 1995 
was much more serious than official data suggested and the austerity program 
imposed in 1996 was by no means a “soft landing”. China gained a mild recovery in 
1997 but caught in the worst recession in 1998 since the reform. 
The full results are reported in Table A5. Table 4 presents a comparison of my 
and official estimates and the effect of my adjustment on the total GDP growth. The 
impact of my adjustment is positive by 0.5 percentage points on the growth of   29
planning period but negative by 1.6 percentage points on the growth of the reform 
period. Besides, my results show a faster growth in the period 2001-08, which is 
perhaps questionable because the official industrial growth is already very high. 
Given the nature of high growth volatility in industry, this could be due to partially a 
relative slow growth basis in the previous period and partially some smoothing 
procedure in the official statistics.  
TABLE 4 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL VALUE-ADDED IN CHINA  
(Annual percentage change) 
 
Industrial Gross Value 
Added Growth 













1952-57 19.8 17.4    6.7 7.6  0.8 
1957-65 9.0 7.5    2.5 3.0  0.5 
1965-71 11.8 10.8    5.3 6.0  0.7 
1971-78 8.5 7.1    4.8 4.9  0.1 
1952-78 11.5 10.0    4.6 5.1  0.5 
           
1978-84 8.8 5.5    8.9 7.5 -1.4 
1984-91 11.2  4.9    8.3 6.1 -2.3 
1991-01 13.3  6.9    10.3 7.6 -2.7 
2001-08 11.9 13.9    11.1 11.6  0.5 
1978-08 11.6  7.7    9.8 8.1 -1.6 
Source: Table A5. 
One of the main criticisms to my commodity-based output index is that it has 
missed the effect of quality change, that is to say the real quality change was 
implicitly counted as the price effect and hence removed in the exercise (Holz, 2006a; 
Rawski, 2008). It is indeed hard to maintain homogeneity of the commodities in the 
exercise. However, there are many products used that are homogenous in nature e.g. 
coal, iron oar, salt, basic metals and basic chemicals, and semi-conductors; pressed 
steel products are measured by types rather than aggregate tonnage, similar products 
including chemical fertilizers and refined oil products; product groups such as fabrics 
are measured using available intra-industry information taking into account the 
quantity and unit value of different fabrics; different types of television set are also 
made “standardized”. Changes of benchmarks in the present exercise have also 
captured some effect of quality changes.    30
FIGURE 2 
DOES WHAT MISSED REALLY SUGGEST QUALITY CHANGE? 
























































































Source: Figure 1. 
 
To see if there is an obvious underestimation of growth by my industrial output 
index due to insufficient representation of quality change, I derive a series of the 
differences between the NBS and my alternative estimates. Its filtered trend is 
intended to get rid off noises. It is reasonable to expect that quality improvement 
should be steady along with economic development rather than highly volatile as 
shown in Figure 2. There is simply no meaningful pattern that can be seen from the 
chart or its filtered trend. If the critique were correct and the gap indeed captured the 
missing quality changes, Chinese industry seemed to have experienced a continuous 
quality improvement from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s but significant quality 
deterioration since the mid 1980s, which is implausible. The findings here simply do 
not support the critique.   31
8. ESTIMATION OF CHINA’S AGGREGATE CAPITAL STOCK 
Since there are no official estimates for China’s aggregate capital stock,
28 
researchers have to construct it using available investment statistics. Caution is 
needed to avoid conceptual pitfalls. Historically, there have been three different 
official investment series available, i.e. “fixed assets investment (FAI)”, 
“accumulation of national income (ANI)” and “gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)”. 
FAI has a long history dated back to the beginning of the 1950s. It was designed as a 
comprehensive indicator that measures the size, structure and growth of investment to 
reflect the economic achievement and to facilitate the central planning.
29 The data 
collection for FAI is conducted through the investment monitoring authorities at 
different administrative levels and published by DFAIS (Department of Fixed Asset 
Investment Statistics, NBS). By contrast, both ANI and GFCF are the concepts of 
national accounts but in very different national accounting systems. ANI is a MPS 
concept that began in the 1950s and stopped by 1993 when China shifted to the SNA 
in principle. Under the Chinese SNA, GFCF replaces ANI. The Department of 
National Accounts of NBS (DNA) has also revised the historical ANI at least for three 
times to reconstruct China’s historical GFCF (see DNA, 1997, 2004 and 2007).  
A good understanding of the differences between these indicators is essential in 
an effort to construct China’s capital stock. Studies before GFCF became available 
could only use ANI statistics (Chow, 1993; He, 1992). The ANI under the MPS is in a 
sense a “pure” concept of investment in the material sectors of the economy in that it 
does not include the depreciation of fixed assets. On the other hand, it is a dirty 
indicator that includes everything produced under the MPS that is not consumed 
(mixed of actual investment and inventory) while leaving all “non-productive” 
investment uncovered. It has no theoretical underpinning by simply adding up the 
                                                 
28 The NBS indeed provides one capital stock indicator, i.e. end-year fixed asset at original value 
(historical costs) (FAOV) for mining and manufacturing industries at or above the township level 
before 1998 and changed to those at or above the designated size afterwards. This poorly designed 
indicator (mixed of prices at various times) has incomplete coverage and inconsistencies. It is 
impossible to estimate the aggregate capital stock using this indicator. It is also a big challenge to the 
estimation of capital stock at industry level (see Wu, 2008b). 
29  FAI consists of three categories that distinguish FAI by nature, namely, “construction and 
installation”, “purchase of equipment”, and “other expenses” that are largely consumables to facilitate 
the above two activities. FAI is also available in eight types: “capital construction”, “replacement and 
upgrading”, “real estate development”, “other fixed asset investment”, “fixed asset investment by urban 
collectives”, “fixed asset investment by rural collectives”, “urban private fixed investment”, and “rural 
private fixed investment” (DFAIS, 1997, pp. 444-445).   32
annual ANI to build up the “stock”. Most would expect the problems of ANI have 
been carefully tackled when it is converted to GFCF. As discussed below, GFCF 
under the Chinese SNA is not problem-free. 
Another often made mistake is the direct use of China’s FAI as the investment 
variable to estimate net capital stock with the perpetual inventory method (Ho and 
Jorgenson, 2001; Young, 2003; Huang et al., 2002; Hu and Khan, 1997; Li at el, 
1992). By the official definition, FAI is less qualified than GFCF. It excludes any 
fixed asset investment project that is smaller than 50,000 yuan and any intangible 
asset; rather it covers the transaction of existing assets (including land transaction).  
In China, land belongs to the state or to semi-state organizations in the case of 
farm land. There is no ownership transfer-based trade of land, but exists the trade of 
“land use rights”. However, the government (both central and local) controls the 
primary release of land use rights according to land size, location, price and timing. 
There have been increasing criticisms on land-revenue and land-financed local public 
spending and the so-called “(local) government-developer conspiracy” that is 
considered highly, if not solely, responsible for China’s property bubbles.  
There is another problem that affects FAI first and then to some extent carried on 
in GFCF. FAI is measured as the “workload” in construction and purchase of fixed 
assets in money terms (NBS, 2001, p.220; DFAIS, 1997, p.444). As correctly noted in 
Chow (1993, p.816), the work performed as recorded in FAI may not produce results 
that meet production standards for fixed assets in the current period. In fact, some of 
the work (investment projects) may take many years to become qualified for fixed 
assets and some may never meet the standards, hence be completely wasted, which is 
a typical phenomenon in all centrally planned economies.  
The nature of the problem shows the conceptual and practical difference of 
China’s national accounts from the SNA. The SNA principle governing the time of 
recording and valuation of GFCF is “when the ownership of the fixed assets is 
transferred to the institutional unit that intends to use them in production” (CEC et al, 
1993, p.223). Xu (1999, pp.62-63) notes that in the SNA a plant construction is 
counted as inventory if it cannot be sold to a buyer (investor) or cannot be used in 
production but it is included in FAI. The problem is aggravated in the case of a large 
project that needs several stages (years) to complete in which the investment   33
“workload” is counted at each stage but the project cannot be used for production 
before all stages are completed.  
Nonetheless, even the reported data for this conceptually problematic FAI can be 
flawed. The “workload”-based accounting system for fixed assets investment has a 
tendency to exaggerate the real investment. As observed at localities, to fulfill annual 
growth target the FAI statistics are manipulated: some non-investment spending are 
reported as fixed asset investment; some previously completed projects are repeatedly 
reported; some planned future investment reported as actual spending. 
In constructing GFCF as part of the national expenditure accounts, now available 
together with inventory, consumption and net export since 1952, the DNA of the NBS 
made tremendous efforts and conducted at least three major rounds of adjustment to 
the historical FAI statistics. But the adjustment procedures have not been made 
transparent. One can reasonably believe that the underlying problems cannot be easily 
fixed. In other wards, GFCF still exaggerates investment by including unfinished 
projects especially in the case of the state sectors. However, it is a better alternative to 
FAI.  
The following questions are how to make an assumption for the initial capital 
stock, how to deflate the annual investment flow as given in GFCF, and how to 
determine the rate of capital consumption. Before proceeding ahead, it should be 
made clear that my estimation of China’s aggregate capital stock will exclude the 
value of land while including the value of residential housing. Strictly speaking, the 
amount of land asset in an economy can be assumed constant. Thus, whether land 
should be included in a production function analysis depends if there is significant 
investment in land that improves the quality of land. Compared with a well developed 
economy, it is more reasonable to include land in the analysis in the case of a 
developing economy. However, there is little information for measuring the real 
change of land quality in China. Residential housing is not productive asset. It is a 
consequence of the investment in productive assets rather than the investment itself. It 
is also a central planning tradition for enterprises and government units to provide 
housing in China.
30 However, how to properly pill off the housing investment from 
the FAI that satisfies the logic of national accounts is a future task. Information on 
                                                 
30 Although this system has been substantially changed since China’s housing reform in the early 
2000s, government units still provide cheap housing for public servants.    34
housing and non-productive structures is only available at industry level within the 
industrial sector with incomplete coverage (above the designated size), yet no such 
information for services.  
Existing studies have given very different estimates for China’s initial (1952) 
capital stock ranging from 60 to 250 billion 1952 yuan (He, 1992; Chow, 1993; Ren 
and Liu, 1997; Maddison, 1998a; Tang, 1999; Wang and Fan, 2000; Young, 2003; 
Huang et al. 2002; Zhang, 2003). In many cases it is never clear how the estimates are 
made and if they are justifiable by the available sectoral information or the situation 
of the macroeconomy. The works by Maddison (1998a) and Young (2003) are 
theoretically sounder. Maddison (1998a) relied on a hypothetical capital/output ratio 
(0.9) justified by the lower bound of the international standard and some pre-war 
estimates by Yeh (1968 and 1979). Young (2003) estimated the initial capital stock by 
assuming that the growth of fixed asset investment is to satisfy the need for output 
growth and to compensate for capital consumption. By contrast, Chow (1993) relied 
on some internal information on capital accumulation, Zhang (2003) used data for 
Shanghai to gauge (rather heroically) the national level of capital stock, and He (1992) 
applied a regression approach in his exercise.   
In the present study, I first estimate the initial capital stock using an approach that 









where  0 K denotes the initial capital stock; g is an average output (GDP) growth rate 
over a (stable) period;  0   is a depreciation rate used for the initial stock estimation; 
0 I is the investment taking place in the initial year. The net capital stock is then 
constructed by the standard perpetual inventory method: 
(6)  1 ) 1 (     t t t K I K   
To solve for  0 K of Equation 5 the national accounts GFCF in 1952 for  0 I , two 
measures of the average GDP growth for the period 1952-56 are used for g  based on 
NBS and my alternative estimates respectively, and  0   is assumed to be 2 percent 
based on the information from the 1951 national asset census (explained below).   35
Directly using the unadjusted NBS data including the national accounts implicit 
deflators, I obtained an initial capital stock of 82.6 billion in 1952 constant yuan. 
However, if using my alternative estimates for these variables and choosing a 5-
percent depreciation rate, the results would be 68.5 billion in 1952 yuan (=171 billion 
1990 yuan). Below I explain why the estimate using the official data should be used 
as the initial level capital stock. 
I evaluate the above estimates by some seldom used information from the 1951 
National Asset Census verifying and evaluating China’s stock of fixed assets, only 
available for publication in 2000 as a collection of achieve planning documents and 
papers by SETC (2000, Vol. 1, pp.1543-4). It shows that by the end of 1951, the total 
market replacement value of fixed assets was 128.3 billion in 1952 yuan. Taking off 
the accumulated depreciation value of 39.2 billion, the net stock would be 89.1 billion 
1952 yuan. The census also gives an annual depreciation rate by sector base on which 
a weighted average of 1.94 percent can be calculated (I then decided to use 2 
percent).
31 My estimate of 82.6 billion using the NBS data comes out quite close to 
the census result of 89.1 billion. Additional information that can be used for 
crosschecking is the share of the industrial net capital stock in the total stock. The 
share is 11.6 percent (for 1951) by the census. If using my estimate for Chinese 
industry in 1952 (Wu, 2008b), including the residential housing owned by the 
industrial sector, this share would be 10.9 percent. I am thus convinced that this 
estimate of 82.6 billion 1952 yuan should be used as the initial stock. This by no 
means suggests that alternative depreciation rates should not be used in the 
construction of the capital stock based on this initial level of the stock. 
Based on Equation 6 two sets of net capital stock series are constructed. They 
both use the same set of depreciation rates from on my earlier work on industries, but 
use very different deflators. My depreciation rates () are based on my earlier work on 
industrial capital stock (Wu, 2008b). Following Hulten and Wykoff (1981), I assumed 
=R/T where T stands for asset lives that are based on official accounting regulations 
(State Council, 1985; Ministry of Finance, 1992) and R is the declining balance rate of 
fixed assets using the empirical findings by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). The so-
                                                 
31 This depreciation rate seems too low given the impact of the wars in China in the first half of 
the twentieth century. However, it should be noted this depreciation is based on survived assets. Given 
the severe shortage of capital, producers who managed to keep their production and survived should try 
hard to prolong asset life and reduce capital consumption.     36
estimated depreciation rates are ranged from 5 to 7 percent across industries. The 
present study sets different annual depreciation rates as 5, 6 and 7 percent, 
respectively, to estimate alternative net capital stocks using the geometric depreciation 
function. Besides, taking into account an increasing market influence on firms’ 
depreciation decision that may have speeded up the depreciation process of fixed 
assets, I also introduced a multiple  depreciation process in the present exercise 
assuming 5 percent for the pre-reform period, 6 percent for the early reform period 
1978-92 and then 7 percent for the period from 1993 onwards. This alternative 
treatment does not satisfy the theory of economic depreciation; however it is 
justifiable for reflecting the shifts of policy regime and hence changes in firms’ 
depreciation practice. 
The only difference between the two estimates of capital stock is deflator. One 
uses the NBS expenditure accounts implicit investment deflator that is obtained with 
nominal investment and growth index of investment at constant price. The other 
exercise employs an alternative deflator based on my estimation. Two price indices 
are used in the estimation, namely, producer price index (PPI) for construction 
materials and PPI for machinery and equipment. The construction materials PPI is a 
weighted index of non-metallic materials and basic and fabricated metals and the 
machinery and equipment PPI is a weighted index of seven industries.
32 
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED ANNUAL GROWTH OF NET CAPITAL STOCK BY OFFICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
DEFLATORS AND BY DIFFERENT DEPRECIATION RATES 
(Annual percentage change) 
  By NBS Deflator  By Alternative Deflator 
  =0.05  =0.07  Multiple s =0.05  =0.07  Multiple s
1952-57  10.8 9.3  10.8    8.9 7.4 8.9 
1957-65  9.6 8.8 9.6    8.6 7.8 8.6 
1965-71  7.5 7.3 7.5    7.4 7.2 7.4 
1971-78  9.0 9.0 8.8    9.7 9.8 9.5 
1952-78  9.2 8.6 9.1    8.7 8.1 8.6 
          
1978-84  8.3 8.2 7.6    9.2 9.2 8.6 
1984-91  9.0 9.0 8.8    9.7 9.7 9.4 
1991-01  11.2 11.3 10.6    15.0 15.4 14.7 
2001-08  12.8 13.0 12.9    13.7 13.7 13.6 
1978-08  10.5 10.6 10.1    12.3 12.4 11.9 
Source: Table A7. 
                                                 
32 They include ordinary and special purpose machinery, transportation equipment, electrical and 
electronic equipment and office equipment. Machinery as consumer goods cannot be separated.     37
Table 5 presents the annual growth rate of the official and alternative estimates of 
China’s net capital stock by different depreciation scenarios (results for  =0.06 are 
not shown). The full results are reported in Table A8. In general, the estimates using 
alternative deflator show a slower growth of net capital stock for the planning period 
but a faster growth for the reform period. The most significant difference between the 
two results is observed for 1991-2001 of the post reform period when the alternative 
deflator based estimates suggest an about 4 percentage point faster growth of China’s 
net capital stock than what given by the national accounts implicit deflator for gross 
fixed capital formation.  
TABLE 6 
INVESTMENT-CAPITAL RATIO, CAPITAL INTENSITY OF OUTPUT AND “RETURN TO CAPITAL” 
(Annual average) 
       “Return to Capital” 
 I/K  K/Y    Y/K*.6 Y/K*.4 Y/K*φ 
1952-57 0.12  0.58   1.04 0.69 1.05 
1957-65 0.12  0.91   0.68 0.46 0.68 
1965-71 0.12  1.04   0.58 0.39 0.56 
1971-78 0.13  1.31   0.46 0.31 0.41 
1952-78 0.12  0.97   0.68 0.45 0.67 
        
1978-84 0.13  1.57   0.38 0.25 0.31 
1984-91 0.14  1.86   0.33 0.22 0.27 
1991-01 0.19  2.94   0.22 0.14 0.18 
2001-08 0.18  4.79   0.13 0.08 0.09 
1978-08 0.16  2.85   0.25 0.17 0.21 
Sources: Tables A6 and A7. 
Notes: Y refers to the estimates based on my alternative assumption for labor productivity 
of the “non-material services” (see Alternative II, Table 2); I refers to GFCF using the 
alternative deflator; K refers to the estimates based on multiple depreciation rates; the 
capital share of the national income is given as 0.6 following Chow (1993), 0.4 following 
Young (2000) and my time-variant estimates (φ) based on the Chinese input-output tables.  
 
Table 6 presents the annual average of investment-capital  stock ratio (I/K), 
capital intensity of output (K/Y) and “return to capital” (Y/K adjusted by the capital 
share of the total income) for both the planning and reform periods using alternative 
deflator. Figures 3 and 4 depict the annual series of these indicators compared with 
estimates using the NBS data.  
The change of the I/K ratio suggests that an increasing investment is required for 
a given unit of capital stock in order to compensate for the capital consumption or to 
maintain an effective capital stock to support the output growth. The period average 
of I/K in Table 6 looks fairly stable prior to the 1990s whereas in it appears to be very   38
volatile in Figure 3(A) with some huge shocks along with the shifts of policy regime 
and changes of macroeconomic situation.  The K/Y ratio suggests that China evolved 
from a labor intensive to a capital intensive economy. It jumped from only 0.97 in the 
planning period to 2.85 in the reform period of which the sub-period 2001-08 saw the 
biggest increase (Table 6).  As in the case of I/K, the K/Y ratio rose even more rapidly 
if based on my estimates (Figure 3(B)). 
FIGURE 3 










































































































































Based on NBS K and GDP Based on alternative K and GDP  
Source: See Table 6. 
 
The estimated “return to capital” in Table 6 is gauged by applying three 
alternative capital shares of the national income (GDP), that is, 60 percent following 
Chow (1993) and Chow and Li (2001), 40 percent following Young (2003), and my 
time-variant estimates using information from the Chinese national accounts and 
input-output tables which show a decreasing capital share from 60 to 40 percent over 
time. As will be discussed in the next section, the estimated TFP is sensitive to the 
choice of the factor shares. All the three estimates suggest a significant diminishing 
“return to capital” with the fastest decline of the estimate using the time variant 
national accounts (input-output table) income shares.    39
FIGURE 4 









































































Source: See Table 6. 
 
While the overall picture does not look encouraging, there are signs with 
interesting implications for further investigations (Figure 4). The central planning 
period experienced the most rapid decline in the history of the People’s Republic 
indicating a very high cost of the growth under the central planning. The Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) period was also very inefficient in terms of capital productivity. 
Beside, the central planning period saw greater volatilities in this ratio with unusual 
jumps in 1963-65 and 1969-70, apparently as a compensation for the unusual drops 
earlier – all can be explained by policy shocks. Yet, the economic reform has not 
turned around the general trend of the diminishing return to capital, but it indeed 
temporarily stopped the decline of the ratio in 1980-85 and 1990-95 likely due to 
positive policy and institutional effects. The decline of the ratio resumed since the mid 
1990s and continued over the subsequent 15 years when China emerged as the “world 
factory”. 
 
9. CHINA’S PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE REVISITED 
Following the above discussion of the key data problems and the construction of 
alternative estimates for the variables required for the standard productivity analysis, 
this section provides TFP estimates using alternative data for the Chinese Economy.  
As mentioned in the earlier discussion, to investigate whether it is the data 
problems that have caused the contradictory TFP estimates the present study applies   40
the same Solow model used in almost all growth accounting studies on the Chinese 
economy. Therefore, I also begin with an assumption of a linearly homogeneous 
Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with a Hick’s neutral shift parameter: 
(7) 
   
1 ) ( L K t A Y  
where Y, K, and L denote output, capital, and labor, respectively, α denotes the output 
elasticity of capital, and the Hicksian A, which is assumed to be a function of time t, 
measures the shift in the production function at the given level of capital and labor. 
With total (logarithmic) differentiation and then a little mathematical rearrangement, 
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capital and labor, which hinges on Solow’s assumption that each input is paid its 
marginal product. As said, this is a theoretical as well as an empirical issue that will 
not be investigated in the present study. 
However, while sticking to the Solow model one more important issue to discuss 
before we proceed further is how to determine the income shares of capital and labor. 
As a preliminary treatment, I opt for the direct use of the income shares from the 
input-output tables by simply taking the labor compensation as α and capital 
compensation as (1 – α) for each year, which gives a set of time-variant estimates for 
α.
33 There was a clear decline of α from about 0.59 in 1952 to 0.45 in 1978 and further 
to 0.41 in 2008. To compare my results with the income shares of factors typically 
used in most of other studies, I choose a fixed α = 0.6 following Young (2000) and a 
fixed α = 0.4 as in Chow (1993).
34 
In Table 7, I report three sets of estimates based on the three different 
assumptions of labor share (α = 0.6, α = 0.4 and α = time-variant IO shares); each set 
                                                 
33 There is of course room to further improve the measure of labor compensation within the input-
output framework. For example, taxes should be allocated to labor and capital by appropriate shares 
and more importantly labor share should be adjusted for self-employment (Gollin, 2002). 
34 A new estimate by Chow and Li (2001) gives an even higher capital share as 0.63 suggesting 
that the labor share is only 0.37.    41
contains results using both the official data and my adjusted data. It is clear that the 
adjusted GDP growth rate has the most impact on the reform period. Let us take the 
results based on the input-output table income shares as an example. Compared with 
the results using the official data, the results using the adjusted data raise annual GDP 
growth by 0.5 percentage points for the central planning period but reduce annual 
GDP growth by 2 percentage points for the reform period. For the growth of capital 
stock, compared the estimates using the national accounts implicit deflator, the 
estimates using my alternative deflator have trivial effect on the planning period but 
raise the growth by 0.9 percentage points per annum for the reform period. The 
impact of the adjusted labor is not significant for both periods.  
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TABLE 7 
ESTIMATES OF TFP FOR THE CHINESE ECONOMY USING OFFICIAL AND ADJUSTED DATA WITH ALTERNATIVE INCOME WEIGHTS 
(Percent change per annum)  
  Data Used Based on Official Estimates














Capital  TFP 
  Time Variant Input-Output Table Weights 
1952-57  4.7 0.9 0.1 3.4 0.3   6.3 0.8 0.1 2.8 2.6 
1957-65  2.1 0.6 0.7 4.1  -3.3   3.4 0.6 0.7 3.7  -1.6 
1965-71  5.1 0.9 1.0 3.6  -0.4   4.8 0.9 1.0 3.6  -0.6 
1971-78  4.8 0.4 1.4 4.5  -1.5   4.4 0.7 1.4 4.8  -2.6 
1952-78  4.1  0.7  0.8  3.9  -1.4     4.6  0.8  0.8  3.8  -0.7 
1978-84  8.5 0.6 0.4 4.1 3.4   7.3 0.8 0.4 4.6 1.6 
1984-91  7.9 1.0 0.1 4.6 2.2   4.7 0.6 0.1 4.9  -0.9 
1991-01  9.8 0.3 0.4 5.2 3.9   7.1 0.3 0.4 7.0  -0.7 
2001-08  10.1 0.2 0.5 6.8 2.6   9.6 0.2 0.5 7.1 1.9 
1978-08  9.2  0.5  0.3  5.2  3.1     7.2  0.4  0.3  6.1  0.3 
  Fixed Labor Income Share as 0.60 (Young, 2000) 
1952-57  4.7 0.9 0.1 3.3 0.4   6.3 0.8 0.1 2.7 2.7 
1957-65  2.1 0.7 0.8 3.7  -3.0   3.4 0.7 0.8 3.3  -1.4 
1965-71  5.1 1.1 1.2 2.9 0.0   4.8 1.1 1.2 2.9  -0.3 
1971-78  4.8 0.5 1.8 3.4  -1.0   4.4 0.9 1.8 3.6  -2.0 
1952-78  4.1  0.8  1.0  3.3  -1.0     4.6  0.9  1.0  3.2  -0.4 
1978-84  8.5 0.9 0.5 2.9 4.2   7.3 1.0 0.5 3.3 2.5 
1984-91  7.9 1.4 0.1 3.4 3.1   4.7 0.7 0.1 3.6 0.2 
1991-01  9.8 0.3 0.5 4.0 4.9   7.1 0.3 0.5 5.5 0.7 
2001-08  10.1 0.3 0.6 4.8 4.3   9.6 0.3 0.6 5.1 3.7 
1978-08  9.2  0.7  0.4  3.9  4.2     7.2  0.6  0.4  4.5  1.7 
  Fixed Labor Income Share as 0.40 (Chow, 1993) 
1952-57  4.7 0.6 0.1 4.9  -0.9   6.3 0.5 0.1 4.0 1.7 
1957-65  2.1 0.5 0.5 5.5  -4.3   3.4 0.5 0.5 5.0  -2.5 
1965-71  5.1 0.7 0.8 4.3  -0.7   4.8 0.7 0.8 4.3  -1.0 
1971-78  4.8 0.4 1.2 5.1  -1.9   4.4 0.6 1.2 5.5  -2.9 
1952-78  4.1  0.5  0.7  5.0  -2.1     4.6  0.6  0.7  4.7  -1.3 
1978-84  8.5 0.6 0.3 4.4 3.2   7.3 0.7 0.3 4.9 1.4 
1984-91  7.9 0.9 0.1 5.0 1.9   4.7 0.5 0.1 5.4  -1.3 
1991-01  9.8 0.2 0.4 6.1 3.2   7.1 0.2 0.4 8.2  -1.7 
2001-08  10.1 0.2 0.4 7.3 2.2   9.6 0.2 0.4 7.6 1.4 
1978-08  9.2  0.4  0.3  5.8  2.7     7.2  0.4  0.3  6.8  -0.3 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: 1) The official data include unadjusted GDP, unadjusted employment and estimated capital stock deflated by the national 
expenditure accounts implicit deflator. 2) The alternative data include adjusted GDP by the “Alternative II” approach (Table 3), adjusted 
employment of “Scenario 3” (Table 1), and the capital stock deflated by alternative deflator. 3) Multiple depreciation rates are used in the 
estimation of capital stock in both cases.   43
Consequently, assuming the input-output table income shares, the estimated TFP 
growth will be substantially reduced from 3.1 to 0.3 percent per annum if shifting 
from the official data to the alternative data, of which about 70 percent of this 
downward adjustment (2.8 percentage points) is attributed to the GDP growth 
adjustment and the rest 30 percent is mainly attributed to the investment deflator 
adjustment that affect the estimated capital stock. The estimated TFP is sensitive to 
the change of income share which can be examined by comparing different panels of 
the table. When the official data are used, the estimated TFP growth will be raised 
from 3.1 to 4.2 percent per annum with an assumed labor share of 60 percent, but it 
will be lowered to 2.7 percent with an assumed labor share of 40 percent. In the case 
of the adjusted data, the estimated TFP growth rate will be raised from 0.3 to 1.7 
percent per annum with an assumed labor share of 60 percent, but it will be lowered to 
-0.3 percent if an assumed labor share of 40 percent is applied. 
Obviously, none of these TFP values is unfamiliar in the existing literature as 
reviewed earlier. This confirms that the estimated TFP growth for the Chinese 
economy is very sensitive to how data are adjusted. If the discussed data problems are 
indeed problematic as discussed, the lower bound rather than the upper bound TFP 
estimates should be closer to the truth. The results also suggest that data problems are 
much more severe in the reform period than in the planning period. 
Change of the income shares of factors also has implications for the long-run 
performance of TFP level. Figure 5 presents alternative TEP level indices for China 
using my adjusted data with different income shares for labor compared with the 
estimate using the official data – all by the input-output table weights. It first shows 
that by any measure China’s TFP level declined significantly during the planning era. 
By 1978 the “best scenario” that assigns 60 percent of income to labor and uses the 
revised data only arrives at 87 percent of the 1952 level.  
For the reform era, it is the estimation using the official data (using the input-
output table weights) that gives the highest level of TFP by 2008 as 256 percent of the 
1978 level (=100).
35 However, if using the adjusted data and assigning 40 percent of 
income paid to labor, the level of TFP was only 92 percent of the 1978 by 2008. This 
                                                 
35 Accumulated TFP from the initial level of 100 in 1978 gives different TFP growth rates from 
what reported in Table 7 because in the latter it is measured as the arithmetic mean of annual changes 
in a given period.   44
is changed to 164 if the labor share is raised to 60 percent. The time-variant input-
output weights always arrive in an estimate of somewhere in between. 
FIGURE 5 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF TFP LEVEL FOR THE CHINESE ECONOMY  
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Source: Author’s calculation. See notes to Table 7, and Appendix Tables A8 
and A9. 
 
  In any set of the estimates in Table 7, the growth of capital stock (representing 
the capital services though arguably) is seen as the most important driver of China’s 
both pre-and post-reform growth, and such an importance was increasing over time. 
The contribution by the quantity of employment declined significantly. As for the 
“quality of labor” with the growth of average schooling as a proxy, although it 
declined in general in the post-reform period compared with the pre-reform period, 
the trend was somehow reversed since the 1990s. In Appendix Table A8 and A9, 
sensitivity tests on TFP estimates for changes in GDP estimates and alternative 
depreciation rates are reported. They show that other things being equal, using 
Scenario 3 in the employment adjustment does not change the TFP estimate and using 
the multiple depreciation rates raises the TFP estimate by 0.2 percentage points. That 
is, choosing different delta within the range of my exercise does not change the result 
very much. 
The estimated TFP performance does not suggest that there has been a stable 
improvement of productivity or efficiency over time. Figure 6 depicts the estimated 
TFP performance against the shift of policy regimes represented by periods adopting 
different policies, that is, the period implementing the Soviet-type central planning in   45
1952-57, the Maoist “Great Leap Forward” campaign and its aftermath in 1958-65, 
the early chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-71, an attempt to catch up 
the lost time in 1972-78, the early reform period in 1979-84 focusing on agriculture, 
the dual-track price reform in industry in 1985-91, the deepening state enterprise 
reform following Deng’s call for bolder reform that led to the official adoption of the 
“socialist market economy” in 1992, and the period following China’s WTO entry in 
2001 (assuming the WTO effect began in 2002).  
FIGURE 6 
SOURCES OF GROWTH OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY  

















































































Source: Table 7. 
 
It is clear by a quick glance at the figure that the growth of TFP was not closely 
associated with the growth of investment. One may therefore be convinced that policy 
and institutional shocks were the best candidate for the explanation of the changes of 
TFP growth over different periods. Interestingly, two significant positive TFP gains 
are observed when China shifted to the central planning in 1952-57 and when China 
began to depart from the central planning system in 1979-84. One-off incentive gains 
due to institutional change could be the main reason. However, all major political 
campaigns, no matter aiming at economic growth, by ideological drive or political 
control during the pre-reform era resulted in severe negative TFP growth. The 
“modernization campaign” following China’s reestablishment of its formal ties with 
the West and Japan in 1972-73 brought about the most rapid growth in investment and 
employment under central planning, but it seemed to be extremely inefficient because 
of wasteful investment together with deteriorating incentive problems. During the   46
period 1972-78, 40 percent of growth vanished due to inefficiency (negative TFP 
growth by 2.5 percent). 
On the other hand, perhaps contrary to that many may have believed, the earlier 
or pre-WTO reform measures between mid 1980s and the beginning of 2000s were 
not TFP growth-promoting. The industrial reform began in 1985 which operated on 
the backbone of the central planning system brought about a shock reflected by a 
negative TFP growth in 1985-91. In the following period 1992-2001, the fast ever 
physical investment made China enjoy the fastest economic growth in history. The 
efficiency of the economy slightly improved though the TFP growth still remained in 
the negative zone.  
However, as shown in Figure 5, the only period that saw a significant positive 
TFP growth was the one following China’s WTO entry, though not as substantial as 
that estimated using the unadjusted official data (Table 7). It means that China could 
benefit from its comparative advantage in labor intensive manufacturing through a 
substantially enlarged market. China found itself in a very competitive position given 
that there had been a huge investment and hence a huge production capacity had been 
built up, of which an increasing part had been underutilized (evidenced by China’s 
persistent deflation from 1998 to 2002). The WTO is productivity promoting because 
it speeds up the learning by doing process through deeper and wider international 
market exposure and further institutional reforms pressured by such an exposure.  
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study is obviously heavily data driven by what I call a “data fundamentalist 
approach”. It revisits the long debate about China’s growth performance by seriously 
tackling the existing data problems that have been the major obstacles to a proper 
assessment of China’s growth performance and the settlement of the debate.  
First, it examines and adjusts the serious break in the official employment 
statistics in 1989-90. Second, it augments the numbers employed by a human capital 
effect using estimated average years of schooling. Third, it tests the sensitivity of 
Maddison (1998a)’s “zero labor productivity growth” assumption in gauging the real 
growth of the so-called “non-material (including all non-market) services” by 
proposing alternative assumptions using my new employment estimates for these   47
services. Fourth, it further improves the author’s earlier physical output-based 
production index for the industrial sector (Wu, 2002a) by using multiple weights and 
time-variant value added ratios obtained from the Chinese input-output tables. The 
likely problem of “product quality” in such a physical measure is examined and 
rejected. Fifth, it provides a new set of estimates of capital stock for the aggregate 
economy using alternative deflators and depreciation rates, crosschecked by the 
author’s industry-level capital stock estimates (Wu, 2008b) and made use of China’s 
first asset census in 1950-51. Base on these new data work, a range of TFP growth 
estimates have been obtained, compared and discussed. 
Data tell the truth but they may also hide the truth. To make them truth-revealing 
one has to identify the problems that disguise the truth and then try to make proper 
adjustments accordingly. However, any data adjustment has to be transparent. The 
next is your knowledge about the economy and the institutions (and their deficiencies!) 
and the mechanism through which the data are produced by state agencies for the 
economy.  
The above is said with the given methodology applied to the data and the 
underpinning theory. That is, to facilitate a sensible comparison with the existing 
studies, we have confined the current study to the well known neoclassical growth 
accounting framework that most of the existing studies explicitly or implicitly 
adopted.
36 As stated at the beginning of the paper, my purpose is to discover how data 
problems may affect the estimated TFP growth rather than exploring a new theoretical 
framework to gauge China’s TFP performance. For this purpose, I use the same 
approach to the existing literature accounting for China’s growth performance. The 
conclusion for the Chinese growth and productivity performance should be made by 
the reader. 
Nevertheless, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that the neoclassical framework 
used in this study is questionable or unacceptable in terms of the discovery of the truth 
(Felipe, 1999). Emphasizing data problems does not mean that methodological 
problems are unimportant. Rather, methodological debate cannot be completely 
settled before major data problems are resolved.  
                                                 
36 Despite the long debate about the real meaning of TFP and its usefulness, we still think it is a 
indispensable tool that provides benchmarks for assessing growth and productivity performance of 
economies. Interested readers may see a criticism by Felipe (1999) in a review of productivity studies 
on the East Asian economies.   48
Given China’s increasing impact on the world economy because of its sheer size, 
fast growth and unique institutional settings for promoting the growth, a proper 
assessment of and explanation for China’s growth performance is an inevitable 
challenge to the economics profession, not only in terms of empirical data and 
methodology but also in terms of theory. 
My intended data tasks in future will include the followings: 
1)  Constructing sector level data following the approach used in this paper, but 
seriously tackling inconsistency problems that may emerge from such an effort 
especially in the estimation of capital stock.  
2)  Improving the estimation of the numbers employment by taking into account 
the actual hours worked by sector, which may give a more reasonable number 
count and distribution of the discrepancy since 1990. 
3)  Improving the estimate of the human capital of the workforce by incorporating 
population census based information. 
4)  Estimating capital services by adopting the user cost approach in principle and 
adjusted for data limit. 
5)  Improving the input-output table based income share estimation by adjusting 
for self-employed.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL GDP AND VALUE ADDED BY 
INDUSTRY 
 
Detailed industry statistics only available based on enterprises at and above the 
“designated size” through a regular (monthly, quarterly and annually) reporting 
system. Smaller “below size” enterprises are monitored by regularly conducted 
sample surveys. There is also workforce “outside the system” is only picked up by 
population censuses or annual 1% population surveys. The majority of the “outside 
system” workers is recorded by a loose definition (i.e. “performing one hour wage-
earning job in the week of the survey) and mainly seasonal, temporal, multi-jobs, thus 
not equivalent to an average of those “within the system” (i.e. above & below the 
“designated size”). A serious inconsistency is found in the current statistical system, 
that is, the sum of value added of the “above size” began to exceed total industrial 
GDP estimated by the national accounts from 2005 (Figure A1).  
 
FIGURE A1 
VALUE-ADDED AND EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AT/ABOVE THE 
























































































Sources: National accounts data are from various volumes of China 
Statistical Yearbook and the “above size” industrial employment, growth 
value of output and value added data are from various volumes of China 
Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook. 
The benchmark line (=1) gives the national totals for both value added and 
employment. There appears to be lack of a system that accommodates all categories   56
of inputs and outputs that make up the national totals. Especially, there is not a 
coherent balance for all industrial activities categorized as “at/above designated size”, 
“below size” and the rest (or “outside the system”). Official data show that the sum of 
the value added by “above size” enterprises was equal to the level of national 
industrial GDP in 2006 leaving 24 million employed of “below size” and 43 ml 
employed “outside the system” producing nothing or simply disappeared!  However, 
this sum exceeded the total industrial GDP in 2007 (by 6%) and in 2008 (by 10%)! 
At an internal joint workshop between The Conference Board and NBS in the late 
May 2010, NBS acknowledged three factors that might be able to explain the problem: 
1) Inconsistency in the enterprises covered by the “system” with a criterion of 5 
million yuan sales – the number of enterprises rose from 160,000 in 1998 to 420,000 
in 2008;
37  2) Double counting due to the so-called “headquarter effect”; 3) Data 
quality and data falsification. Mainly because of this problem, the Department of 
Industrial Statistics (DIS) of NBS that is responsible for handling the firm level data 
at/above designated size and producing estimates of gross output and value added for 
each industry at/above the size has stopped providing their value added estimates 
since 2008. 
 
                                                 
37  NBS has decided to raise the cut-off line from 5 to 20 million from 2010, which will 
substantially increase the size of the enterprises covered while reducing the number of enterprises 
covered. A new inconsistency problem will then be followed.    57
APPENDIX B 
 
DIFFERENT OFFICIAL MEASURES OF PRICE CHANGES 
 
One of the motivations behind the this type of studies is that volume movements 
can better gauge the real growth since it can bypass official problematic price data or 
inflation measures as well as upward bias due to institutional problems in data 
reporting (exaggerating growth due to political reason). Despite of tremendous efforts 
made by NBS, problems in price measurement have not gone. Evidence has shown 
that the price problem has been further complicated by the recent adjustment of real 
growth rate following China’s first Economic Census for 2004. I found that the NBS 
post-census time series adjustment bypassed deflator problem and was made directly 
to the real output, which implicitly “adjusted” underlying prices (Wu, 2007). After 
replicating the adjustment procedures using the standard interpolation approach, it is 
also clear that the NBS post-census adjustment arbitrarily modified the results 
obtained by the standard interpolation approach and deliberately left the original but 
debated estimates for 1998 intact.
38  
FIGURE A2 
ALTERNATIVE OFFICIAL PRICE INDICES FOR INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT 











































































































































Sources & Notes: Basic data for calculating comparable price index (CPPI) are from China Industrial 
Economy Statistical Yearbook (DITS, various issues) and data for calculating the implicit GDP 
deflator are from China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2007, pp.57 & 59). PPI data are directly from 
                                                 
38 The problem of the post-census adjustment is more to do with services. However, we have 
reservations about the adjusted growth rate also because it is not clear whether the underreported 
services as discovered by the census only appeared after 1992. If the extent of underreporting was 
similar prior to 1992, no adjustment is needed, and if it was higher, which is not unlikely because one 
may reasonably assume that official statistical practices will improve over time, the growth rate should 
be downward rather than upward adjusted.   58
China Statistical Yearbook (NBS, 2007, p.330). CPPI is calculated using the “comparable price”-
approach estimated industrial GVO and nominal GVO available at industry level. Such data were 
stopped after 2003. Internal source confirmed that NBS stopped using this approach at least in this 
part of statistics. To compare with other indices presented here, we assume that CPPI in 2004-06 
follows the changes of PPI in all industries, and the so-derived changes for industries are used to 
estimate changes over this period for the industry as a whole. The implicit GDP deflator is simply 
derived as the difference between nominal and real growth indices of industrial GDP. The 
nominal growth index is calculated using NBS nominal GDP data and the real industrial GDP 
index is directly from the NBS source. 
 
To demonstrate the complicity of the price problem in the estimation of real 
industrial output, in Figure A2 I present three official price indices for the industry as 
a whole (including manufacturing, mining and utilities), namely, the comparable price 
index (CPPI) adopted under the MPS and used until 2003, producer price index (PPI) 
and an implicit GDP deflator for industry. A note to Figure 1 explains where our data 
are obtained and how the indices are constructed. It should be noted that both CPPI 
and PPI refer to the gross value of industrial output, whereas the (implicit) GDP 
deflator refers to the industrial gross value added. The annual fluctuations follow a 
similar pattern but to different degrees. The CPPI appears to be the least volatile index 
while the PPI is the most. The GDP deflator stays in between. Intuitively, it follows 
that if the nominal output is given, the CPPI suggests the highest real growth, whereas 
PPI implies the slowest growth, leaving the GDP deflator again in the middle. It is 
never clear what deflation procedures that NBS follows to estimate the real industrial 
value added. However, Panel B implies that the (underlying) value added ratio must 
be high enough and rapidly growing to compensate for the high and rising input prices 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ESTIMATION OF CHINESE MILITARY PERSONNEL 
 
A country’s armed forces provide national defense services, which are regarded 
as part of the government services, and hence should be included in the country’s 
service employment. However, there has been little systematic information on China’s 
armed forces. Given that China has maintained the world’s largest armed forces 
through out its post-war history, and its size of military personnel was particularly 
large in the early 1950s, if military personnel were not counted, China’s per capita 
GDP growth would be exaggerated. Therefore, before estimating China’s service 
GDP we need to check whether the official service employment statistics have 
included military personnel.  
The earliest information can be found in the first official publication on labour 
statistics, Zhongguo Laodong Gongzi Tongji Ziliao [China labour and Wage Statistics] 
1949-1985 by DSS (Department of Social Statistics, NBS) in 1987. In that 
publication’s “Indicator Explanation”, it specifies that both “working-age population” 
and “general labour resources” indicators do not include military personnel (DSS, 
1987, p.267). In one the statistical tables, it also confirms that the “working-age 
population” counted in China’s first (1953), second (1964) and third (1982) 
population censuses do not include military personnel (p.4). This clearly implies that 
all official employment series back to 1949 did not include military personnel. The 
same definition was followed in the later DSS publication in 1989 updating the earlier 
data (DSS, 1989, p.323) and in the annual labour statistical publication, China Labour 
Statistical Yearbook (CLSY), which started in 1990.  
For crosschecking this finding, we have also looked at the explanations for labour 
statistical indicators in the NBS’s annual publication, China Statistical Yearbook 
(CSY), which was firstly released in 1981. I have found that prior to the 1988 issue, 
CSY did not explicitly explain whether military personnel were included (e.g. see 
NBS, 1985, p.657). However, it should be noted that CSY did use the same indicator 
“social laborers” as that used in DSS, which was in fact a sub-category of the “general 
labour resources” (DSS, 1987, p.267). My comparison of the data in the two 
publications shows that the statistics for total and service employees in the pre-1988 
issues of CSY are the same as those in the DSS publications. In 1988, one year after   61
aforementioned the first DSS publication, CSY adopted the same DSS definition 
(NBS, 1988, p.206). 
An important change came with the 1994 issue of CLSY that for the first time 
indicated that military personnel should be included in the category of “other persons 
employed” (DPES and DCPW, p.587). This change also appeared in a collection of 
government policies on labour statistical indicators jointly published by NBS and 
Ministry of Labour in the same year (NBS and MoL, 1994, p.9). As for CSY, 
although it abandoned the DSS definition in the 1994 issue, it did not clearly indicate 
under what category military personnel should be recorded until 1997. The 1997 issue 
of CSY showed the same definition for “other persons employed” as that in the 1994 
issue of CLSY. But this inconsistency in timing might not be an accident. In fact, a 
closer examination of the labour statistics show that there was not any change in 
statistics in 1994 associated with the change of the definition, neither in the total 
numbers employed nor in the numbers of service employment.  
The first adjustment appeared in 1997 in both CLSY and CSY covering the data 
up to 1996, which only adjusted the previous employment statistics from 1990 to 
1995 leaving the pre-1990 series untouched (DPES and DCPW, 1997, p.9; NBS, 1997, 
Table 4-1). A further adjustment was made in 2002, which revised the series since 
1990 again (NBS, 2002). Note that the adjustment was not specifically made for the 
missing military personnel but for all major sectors of the economy.
39 Therefore the 
effect of the adjustment for the military personnel is implicit. Following the new 
definition, one could only say that the military personnel should be included in the 
“others” of the tertiary employment, but could not tell its actual size for any year of 
this period. However, one thing is clear that there has been no adjustment for the 
military personnel for the pre-1990 period.  
In what follows, I attempt to construct a time series for China’s military 
personnel using publicly available information. The procedures are presented in Table 
                                                 
39 The adjustment in 1997 substantially raised the original estimates for employment in 1990-95. 
It began with the adjustment for 1990. For that year the total numbers employed was raised by 71.69 
million from the previous estimation (567.40), of which 43.79 were in the primary sector, 14.96 in the 
secondary sector and 12.95 in the tertiary sector (NBS, 1997, Table 4-1). The second adjustment was 
made in 2002. For 1990 it further raised the total numbers employed by 8.4 million, of which 4.86 were 
in the primary sector, 2.02 in the secondary sector and 1.51 million in the tertiary sector. Note that all 
these adjustments were made after Maddison made his estimation based on the earlier official statistics 
(Maddison, 1998a).    62
A1. I mark the benchmark years with asterisk (*) for which information is available. I 
also provide the key assumptions for gauging the volume movement between the 
benchmarks. References for the information used in the estimation are also provided.  
TABLE A1 
ESTIMATED CHINA’S MILITARY PERSONNEL WITH THE INFORMATION FOR BENCHMARKS AND 















Official estimate of the size of the PLA at the end of the Chinese Civil War 










China’s first post-war demobilization, mainly cutting the size of the army 
while increasing the air force and navy, reduced the size of the military 



















There were large scale recruitments for the Korean War in this year, which 
increased the size of the military personnel to 6110 according to CCSEC 
(1994a, p.144). An estimate from other sources is 6270 (Zhang, 2006, p.23; 
and (Chen, Youth Daily, September 7, 2003). Taking an average of the two 
estimates and plus the armed “public security force” of 510 (CCSEC, 










The second demobilization began in January when the Korean War entered 
a stage of stalemate. According to CCSEC, the military personnel was 










As a decision on a new round (the third) of demobilization was made in 
August 1953 aiming to complete it by the end of 1955 (CCSEC, 1994a, 
p.145), we assume there was no change for this year. 










The third demobilization was carried out in 1954-55. We only know that by 
the end of 1955 the size of military personnel was cut by 21.2% from the 







As given by CCSEC, at the end of the fourth demobilization (1958) the 
military personnel was cut by 36% from the 1956 level (1994a, p.155). 













The fourth demobilization began in October 1956. By the end 1958 the 
Chinese military force reduced to around 2400, reaching the smallest size 
since 1949 (CCSEC, 1994a, p.155). However, Zhang’s source suggests 
2370 (2006, p.23). 







No information, assuming constant growth rate interpolation between 1959 
and 1965. 
1961  3065  2889  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1959 and 1965. 
1962  3464  3265  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1959 and 1965. 
1963  3915  3689  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1959 and 1965. 
1964  4424  4170  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1959 and 1965. 







No information, assuming constant growth rate interpolation between 1965 
and 1971. 
1967  5313  5234  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1965 and 1971. 
1968  5477  5395  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1965 and 1971. 
1969  5646  5562  Constant growth rate interpolation between 1965 and 1971. 













As suggested in CCSEC, the increase of the military personnel had been out 
of control in the 1960s and by this year it reached a level that was 2.5 times 
the 1958 level, i.e. rising by 3600, or 120% of the 1965 level (1994a, 
pp.253-254). 
1972  6185  6093  No information, assuming to follow the growth rate of 1965-71  
1973  6376  6281  Assume to follow the growth rate of 1965-71 













Assume to follow the growth rate of 1965-71. However, Zhang shows that 
in 1975 the size of the military personnel increased to 6600 (2006, p.23). 
Since this figure is very close to our average estimate for this year, we stick 







The fifth demobilization took place and cut the military personnel by 13.6% 
from the 1975 level (Chen, Youth Daily, September 7, 2003). 
1977 5640  5747  By  mid-point  interpolation. 
1978 5427  5534  By  mid-point  interpolation. 










The sixth demobilization was conducted in the late 1980 and the seventh in 
1982, together cutting the size by 1000 by the end of 1985, reaching 4000 







No information, assuming constant growth rate interpolation between 1980 
and 1985. 
1982  4573  4677  Assume constant growth rate interpolation between 1980 and 1985. 
1983  4373  4473  Assume constant growth rate interpolation between 1980 and 1985. 







See the entry for 1980. However, another source suggests the size was 4238 







The eighth demobilization was decided by Deng in 1985 to cut 1000 by 







As announced in a press conference in 1986, the PLA would maintain a size 
of 3000 and officer-soldier ratio 1:3.3 (CCSEC, 1994a, p.312). 










The decision on the ninth demobilization was made to cut 500 in the 
following three years as given in China’s Defense White Paper 2000 (IOSC, 
2000. p.25). 
1998  2823  2912  Assume to be cut at a constant rate between 1997 and 2000. 
1999  2657  2740  Assume to be cut at a constant rate between 1997 and 2000. 







Maintained at 2500 as given in China’s Defense White Paper 2002 (IOSC, 
2002. p.10). 







The tenth demobilization was decided to further cut 200 by 2005 (Zhang, 
2006, p.22). 
2004  2400  2450  Assume declined at a constant rate between 2003 and 2005. 
2005*  2300  2350  The target of the tenth demobilization was achieved (IOSC, 2006). 
Sources: See references in the table and the text. 
Notes: Asterisk * marks the benchmark year that is supported by the available information. #Assuming the year 
average figure is equal to the end-year figure for 1949. 
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TABLE A2 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF CHINESE EMPLOYMENT, 1949-2008 
(Mid-year estimates in thousands) 
 Total  Agriculture Industry  Construction Services 
1949 182,365 162,311  5,818  1,250  12,986 
1950 190,647 167,636  7,213  1,599  14,200 
1951 201,402 173,135  8,942  2,045  17,280 
1952  209,909  174,314 11,323  2,563 21,709 
1953  215,165  175,320 13,099  3,131 23,615 
1954  220,443  179,490 14,373  3,612 22,968 
1955  224,788  183,715 14,506  4,469 22,098 
1956  230,480  185,680 13,874  8,031 22,895 
1957  237,358  189,265 13,877  9,173 25,043 
1958  254,593  173,995 29,081 17,009 34,508 
1959  266,265  158,805 36,482 25,908 45,070 
1960  262,821  166,435 29,298 18,272 48,816 
1961  260,239  183,815 26,012  8,828 41,584 
1962  260,765  205,115 19,644  4,931 31,075 
1963  266,439  216,210 16,686  3,799 29,744 
1964  276,050  223,835 16,637  4,468 31,110 
1965  286,742  230,985 17,616  5,339 32,802 
1966  297,452  238,465 19,011  6,029 33,947 
1967  308,329  247,310 20,030  6,275 34,714 
1968  319,040  256,140 20,620  6,400 35,880 
1969  331,262  265,900 22,287  6,578 36,497 
1970  344,018  274,640 25,869  6,871 36,638 
1971  358,569  282,187 31,371  7,074 37,937 
1972  370,723  286,848 37,053  7,064 39,758 
1973  381,176  291,546 41,538  7,133 40,959 
1974  394,355  298,738 45,705  7,329 42,583 
1975  407,832  304,301 50,950  7,750 44,831 
1976  420,755  307,990 57,520  8,301 46,943 
1977  432,389  309,938 62,859  9,089 50,502 
1978  445,275  306,522 72,669  9,340 56,744 
1979  460,272  305,337 83,134  9,433 62,368 
1980  478,803  312,272 89,689 10,251 66,593 
1981  500,538  321,163 96,844 10,933 71,598 
1982  518,955  335,917 96,437 11,829 74,772 
1983  532,410  348,083 93,068 13,313 77,947 
1984  548,320  349,537 95,645 16,283 86,854 
1985  567,167  350,841 99,434 20,603 96,290 
1986 583,376 354,460 103,328  23,989 101,598 
1987 598,070 358,935 106,509  26,143 106,483 
1988 613,437 366,085 107,627  27,791 111,933 
1989 626,203 376,557 106,113  28,128 115,405 
1990 637,803 386,034 107,532  27,729 116,508 
1991 651,200 390,061 111,510  27,847 121,782 
1992 658,215 388,985 113,032  28,818 127,379 
1993 664,800 381,893 114,892  31,708 136,307 
1994 671,315 371,539 117,021  34,365 148,390 
1995 677,600 360,790 119,190  35,646 161,974 
1996 685,075 351,748 121,880  37,411 174,036 
1997 693,850 348,300 124,429  39,324 181,797 
1998 702,285 350,087 123,828  41,908 186,463 
1999 710,155 354,728 120,812  44,289 190,325 
2000 717,395 359,054 117,652  45,547 195,142 
2001 725,550 362,778 115,721  46,795 200,257 
2002 733,825 366,915 113,072  47,248 206,590 
2003 740,860 367,081 114,185  45,101 214,493 
2004 748,160 359,075 123,142  41,845 224,099 
2005 755,125 346,194 132,810  42,210 233,911 
2006 761,125 332,655 141,061  45,484 241,925 
2007 766,950 320,025 150,186  49,084 247,655 
2008 772,350 310,490 156,803  51,887 253,170 
Source: See Section 4, Scenario 3, for the method used. Official data in Table A3 are used as a base. 
Note: Estimated military personnel for 1949-89 are included in services (see Table A1).   65
TABLE A3 
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF CHINESE EMPLOYMENT, 1952-2008 
(Mid-year estimates in thousands) 
 Total  Agriculture 
Industry & 
Construction  Services 
1952  207,290  173,170 15,310 18,810 
1953  210,465  175,320 16,230 18,915 
1954  215,980  179,490 17,985 18,505 
1955  220,800  183,715 18,975 18,110 
1956  226,730  185,680 21,905 19,145 
1957  233,945  189,265 23,050 21,630 
1958  251,855  173,995 46,090 31,770 
1959  263,865  158,805 62,390 42,670 
1960  260,265  166,435 47,570 46,260 
1961  257,350  183,815 34,840 38,695 
1962  257,500  205,115 24,575 27,810 
1963  262,750  216,210 20,485 26,055 
1964  271,880  223,835 21,105 26,940 
1965  282,030  230,985 22,955 28,090 
1966  292,375  238,465 25,040 28,870 
1967  303,095  247,310 26,305 29,480 
1968  313,645  256,140 27,020 30,485 
1969  325,700  265,900 28,865 30,935 
1970  338,285  274,640 32,740 30,905 
1971  350,260  281,040 37,540 31,680 
1972  357,370  283,400 41,330 32,640 
1973  362,530  285,700 43,840 32,990 
1974  370,105  290,375 46,020 33,710 
1975  377,685  293,370 49,320 34,995 
1976  385,010  294,495 53,815 36,700 
1977  391,055  293,915 57,210 39,930 
1978  397,645  288,285 63,880 45,480 
1979  405,880  284,750 70,795 50,335 
1980  416,925  288,775 74,605 53,545 
1981  430,430  294,495 78,550 57,385 
1982  445,100  303,180 81,745 60,175 
1983  458,655  310,050 85,125 63,480 
1984  473,165  310,095 91,345 71,725 
1985  490,350  309,990 99,870 80,490 
1986 505,775 311,925 108,000  85,850 
1987 520,325 314,585 114,710  91,030 
1988 535,585 319,555 119,390  96,640 
1989 548,315 327,365 120,640 100,310 
1990 600,390 360,691 129,161 110,538 
1991 651,200 390,061 139,357 121,782 
1992 658,215 388,985 141,850 127,379 
1993 664,800 381,893 146,600 136,307 
1994 671,315 371,539 151,386 148,390 
1995 677,600 360,790 154,836 161,974 
1996 685,075 351,748 159,291 174,036 
1997 693,850 348,300 163,753 181,797 
1998 702,285 350,087 165,735 186,463 
1999 710,155 354,728 165,102 190,325 
2000 717,395 359,054 163,199 195,142 
2001 725,550 362,778 162,516 200,257 
2002 733,825 366,915 160,320 206,590 
2003 740,860 367,081 159,287 214,493 
2004 748,160 359,075 164,987 224,099 
2005 755,125 346,194 175,020 233,911 
2006 761,125 332,655 186,545 241,925 
2007 766,950 320,025 199,270 247,655 
2008 772,350 310,490 208,690 253,170 
Sources: Various issues of China Statistical Yearbook and China Labor Employment Yearbook. 
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TABLE A4-1 






Primary  Junior High Senior High Tertiary 
1949 947  646 219 61 21 
1950 1,097 783 234 62 18 
1951 1,469  1,166 225 59 19 
1952 1,743  1,490 185 36 32 
1953 3,437  2,935 398 56 48 
1954 4,016  3,325 576 68 47 
1955 4,254  3,229 870 100 55 
1956 5,054  4,051 785 155 63 
1957 6,335  4,980 1,112 187 56 
1958 7,448  6,063 1,116 197 72 
1959 7,354  5,473 1,491 320 70 
1960 9,335  7,340 1,422 437 136 
1961 8,391  5,808 1,892 540 151 
1962 7,837  5,590 1,584 486 177 
1963 6,948  4,768 1,523 458 199 
1964 7,682  5,674 1,386 418 204 
1965 9,098  6,676 1,738 498 186 
1966 11,046  9,005 1,620 280 141 
1967 11,252  8,995 1,864 268 125 
1968 20,416  14,282 5,190 794 150 
1969 19,039  14,895 3,614 380 150 
1970 23,493  16,525 6,189 676 103 
1971 23,120  13,760 8,350 1,004 6 
1972 26,680  14,149 10,355 2,159 17 
1973 28,311  13,490 11,294 3,497 30 
1974 30,041  15,210 10,606 4,182 43 
1975 35,063  19,994 10,477 4,473 119 
1976 42,279  24,895 12,060 5,175 149 
1977 47,380  25,739 15,586 5,861 194 
1978 46,800  22,879 16,926 6,830 165 
1979 44,811  20,879 16,579 7,268 85 
1980 36,573  20,533 9,648 6,245 147 
1981 37,398  20,757 11,542 4,959 140 
1982 34,708  20,689 10,321 3,241 457 
1983 32,315  19,807 9,603 2,570 335 
1984 31,917  19,950 9,504 2,176 287 
1985 32,681  19,999 9,983 2,383 316 
1986 33,948  20,161 10,570 2,824 393 
1987 35,357  20,430 11,173 3,222 532 
1988 34,749  19,303 11,572 3,321 553 
1989 33,790  18,571 11,343 3,300 576 
1990 33,564  18,631 11,091 3,228 614 
1991 33,616  18,967 10,855 3,180 614 
1992 33,588  18,724 11,023 3,237 604 
1993 33,682  18,415 11,342 3,354 571 
1994 34,342  18,996 11,526 3,183 637 
1995 35,969  19,615 12,274 3,275 805 
1996 36,439  19,341 12,790 3,469 839 
1997 38,600  19,601 14,424 3,746 829 
1998 41,987  21,174 15,802 4,181 830 
1999 44,228  23,137 15,898 4,345 848 
2000 46,034  24,192 16,071 4,821 950 
2001 47,191  23,969 17,070 5,116 1,036 
2002 48,991  23,519 18,799 5,336 1,337 
2003 50,493  22,679 19,956 5,981 1,877 
2004 51,388  21,352 20,704 6,941 2,391 
2005 52,687  20,195 21,065 8,359 3,068 
2006 52,795  19,285 20,624 9,111 3,775 
2007 52,659  18,702 19,568 9,911 4,478 
2008 52,978  18,650 18,629 10,580 5,119 
Source: Various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. 
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TABLE A4-2 


































1949 5  5  500 282 182 1.77  2.74
1950 6  6  501 298 191 1.68  2.63
1951 8  8  504 314 201 1.61  2.50
1952 10  10 509 324 210 1.57  2.43
1953 19  20 524 331 215 1.58  2.44
1954 22  23 542 339 220 1.60  2.46
1955 23  24 560 346 225 1.62  2.49
1956 27  28 583 354 230 1.65  2.53
1957 34  35 612 364 237 1.68  2.58
1958 41  42 648 372 255 1.74  2.55
1959 39  40 682 378 266 1.80  2.56
1960 50  52 728 377 263 1.93  2.77
1961 43  46 766 372 260 2.06  2.94
1962 40  43 801 374 261 2.14  3.07
1963 35  38 831 382 266 2.17  3.12
1964 40  43 866 390 276 2.22  3.14
1965 48  50 907 398 287 2.28  3.16
1966 60  62 961 411 297 2.34  3.23
1967 61  63  1,014 422 308 2.40  3.29
1968 104  110  1,114 434 319 2.57  3.49
1969 102  106  1,209 447 331 2.70  3.65
1970 120  126  1,323 460 344 2.87  3.85
1971 111  118  1,428 473 358 3.02  3.99
1972 123  134  1,547 486 368 3.19  4.21
1973 125  139  1,671 497 376 3.36  4.45
1974 136  150  1,805 508 386 3.56  4.67
1975 165  180  1,967 517 397 3.80  4.95
1976 202  219  2,167 532 408 4.07  5.32
1977 220  241  2,386 546 416 4.37  5.73
1978 209  233  2,595 560 426 4.63  6.09
1979 197  221  2,790 575 438 4.85  6.37
1980 171  189  2,950 589 453 5.01  6.51
1981 175  191  3,112 607 471 5.13  6.61
1982 167  181  3,262 625 490 5.22  6.66
1983 157  169  3,399 645 508 5.27  6.68
1984 156  167  3,532 665 528 5.31  6.69
1985 158  171  3,668 686 551 5.35  6.66
1986 163  177  3,807 702 572 5.42  6.66
1987 168  183  3,953 720 592 5.49  6.67
1988 163  179  4,092 735 614 5.57  6.67
1989 158  173  4,224 749 633 5.64  6.67
1990 157  173  4,355 763 643 5.71  6.78
1991 158  174  4,485 775 651 5.79  6.89
1992 158  173  4,613 785 658 5.88  7.01
1993 157  173  4,740 795 665 5.96  7.13
1994 161  177  4,869 805 671 6.05  7.25
1995 168  185  5,006 814 678 6.15  7.39
1996 168  187  5,142 822 685 6.25  7.51
1997 176  195  5,286 834 694 6.34  7.62
1998 191  212  5,446 843 702 6.46  7.75
1999 203  225  5,616 852 710 6.60  7.91
2000 212  235  5,795 889 717 6.52  8.08
2001 215  240  5,977 898 726 6.65  8.24
2002 219  247  6,164 903 734 6.83  8.40
2003 222  253  6,356 910 741 6.99  8.58
2004 221  257  6,549 922 748 7.10  8.75
2005 222  263  6,746 942 755 7.16  8.93
2006 220  265  6,943 951 761 7.30  9.12
2007 219  267  7,141 958 767 7.45  9.31
2008 220  271  7,340 967 772 7.59  9.50
Sources: Basic data are from Table A4-1.  
Notes: See Table 2. *All “years of schooling” measured in this table are primary-level equivalent except for the first 
column.    68
TABLE A5 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF CHINESE GDP BY SECTOR, 1949-2008 














1949 245,505  138,124 29,350  4,291 73,741  56,600 
1950 252,776  143,449 30,623  4,477 74,227  56,423 
1951 292,583  167,229 32,285  4,720 88,349  66,946 
1952 317,736  176,512 32,285  4,720  104,219  80,329 
1953 349,106  179,615 41,763  6,438  121,291  89,137 
1954 353,271  182,499 47,248  6,220  117,304  83,909 
1955 370,694  196,806 50,068  7,079  116,740  83,182 
1956 399,479  205,832 58,622 11,919  123,105  85,587 
1957 428,046  212,062 72,030 11,168  132,786  94,833 
1958  513,907 213,289 113,506  16,752 170,360  126,398 
1959  556,058 179,788 143,449  17,707 215,113  164,593 
1960  546,681 150,587 146,568  17,955 231,571  181,516 
1961 443,434  153,151 79,337  6,212  204,733  170,019 
1962 417,553  160,338 71,106  7,691  178,419  147,310 
1963 450,336  178,739 83,822  9,683  178,092  145,625 
1964  514,178 202,189 105,217  12,162 194,611  158,787 
1965  563,001 222,343 128,403  13,451 198,803  158,799 
1966  604,724 238,817 157,088  14,715 194,103  147,617 
1967  577,810 243,706 129,827  13,980 190,298  145,268 
1968  557,207 240,362 118,168  11,337 187,340  145,370 
1969  626,757 242,752 156,271  15,249 212,484  161,906 
1970  713,597 261,889 212,810  19,885 219,013  162,289 
1971  751,792 267,207 237,905  22,291 224,389  165,825 
1972  770,222 265,318 253,082  21,822 229,999  166,102 
1973  822,376 289,654 272,665  22,564 237,492  168,547 
1974  839,207 302,109 275,074  23,963 238,061  169,858 
1975  895,978 309,060 311,419  27,270 248,228  176,853 
1976  868,348 304,124 287,942  28,443 247,839  178,470 
1977  916,283 297,898 325,121  28,927 264,338  185,898 
1978 1,023,620 310,648 385,323 28,761  298,888  207,264 
1979 1,086,615 329,853 409,186 29,329  318,247  224,811 
1980 1,152,160 325,442 426,692 37,171  362,855  244,438 
1981 1,205,401 348,426 433,358 38,350  385,267  263,094 
1982 1,294,990 388,896 456,364 39,662  410,069  283,717 
1983 1,422,816 421,319 488,539 46,430  466,528  318,612 
1984 1,585,599 476,264 531,689 51,469  526,177  362,210 
1985 1,742,705 485,380 595,433 62,896  598,996  398,626 
1986 1,836,844 501,699 620,576 72,878  641,691  409,521 
1987 1,985,844 525,864 670,557 85,902  703,521  429,859 
1988 2,075,163 538,783 704,563 92,766  739,051  443,523 
1989 2,046,607 555,128 703,476 84,932  703,070  432,497 
1990 2,075,673 595,832 685,800 85,940  708,101  434,317 
1991 2,202,896 609,892 744,329 94,160  754,515  454,545 
1992 2,430,161 638,637 788,879 113,960 888,684  525,637 
1993 2,719,916 668,632 889,582 134,470 1,027,232  598,844 
1994 2,976,006 695,502 979,776 152,860 1,147,868  660,895 
1995 3,440,260 730,184  1,257,681 171,810  1,280,585  733,241 
1996 3,575,413 767,365  1,219,739 186,430  1,401,879  807,960 
1997 3,787,113 794,235  1,301,887 191,310  1,499,681  890,216 
1998 3,805,046 822,043  1,184,722 208,560  1,589,721  925,301 
1999 3,987,241 845,164  1,240,803 217,490  1,683,784  990,916 
2000 4,196,480 865,473  1,324,351 229,820 1,776,836  1,044,687 
2001 4,473,083 889,843  1,446,649 245,409 1,891,182  1,109,370 
2002 4,994,075 915,776  1,775,319 266,975 2,036,005  1,185,489 
2003 5,483,446 938,272  2,049,634 299,235 2,196,305  1,243,017 
2004 6,049,793 997,383  2,385,222 323,563 2,343,624  1,312,834 
2005 6,571,906  1,049,553  2,537,214 375,317  2,609,821  1,414,156 
2006 7,366,567  1,102,031  2,891,708 439,976  2,932,852  1,531,198 
2007 8,246,584  1,143,291  3,322,126 511,190  3,269,977  1,641,454 
2008 8,776,138  1,204,783  3,596,862 559,763  3,414,730  1,631,465 
Source: See Sections 6 and 7 for the estimation. 
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TABLE A6 
OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF CHINESE GDP BY SECTOR, 1952-2008 














1952 218,734 156,385 13,264  4,720 44,365  20,475 
1953 240,433 159,356 17,999  6,438 56,639  24,485 
1954 245,778 162,065 21,473  6,220 56,019  22,625 
1955 263,295 174,869 22,891  7,079 58,457  24,898 
1956 291,353 183,087 29,437 11,919 66,909  29,392 
1957 302,961 188,763 32,793 11,168 70,237  32,283 
1958 339,726 189,518 50,305 16,752 83,151  39,189 
1959 338,097 159,385 64,943 17,707 96,062  45,541 
1960 321,343 133,246 68,905 17,955  101,237  51,181 
1961 258,579 135,111 42,032  6,212 75,224  40,509 
1962 253,577 141,191 36,442  7,691 68,253  37,144 
1963 279,375 157,146 41,288  9,683 71,258  38,791 
1964 323,965 177,417 51,858 12,162 82,527  46,704 
1965 369,115 194,627 65,238 13,451 95,799  55,795 
1966 397,417 208,640 80,764 14,715 93,297  46,812 
1967 388,841 212,604 68,569 13,980 93,688  48,659 
1968 378,155 209,203 62,946 11,337 94,668  52,698 
1969 416,826 210,876 83,718 15,249  106,982  56,404 
1970  474,536  227,114 113,187  19,885 114,350  57,627 
1971  502,064  231,429 127,109  22,291 121,235  62,671 
1972  515,163  229,346 136,770  21,822 127,225  63,327 
1973  555,515  249,987 148,806  22,564 134,157  65,213 
1974  570,883  260,237 150,294  23,963 136,389  68,187 
1975  610,376  265,441 174,341  27,270 143,324  71,949 
1976  602,035  260,663 168,936  28,443 143,993  74,623 
1977  634,591  254,929 193,263  28,927 157,473  79,033 
1978  697,810  265,490 224,935  28,761 178,624  86,999 
1979  742,786  281,775 244,409  29,329 187,272  93,836 
1980  807,994  277,597 275,343  37,171 217,882  99,465 
1981  847,466  296,981 280,133  38,350 232,003  109,830 
1982  917,617  331,220 296,302  39,662 250,433  124,081 
1983 1,021,157  358,797 325,107 46,430  290,823  142,908 
1984 1,164,404  405,012 373,397 51,469  334,526  170,559 
1985 1,318,672  412,480 441,390 62,896  401,906  201,535 
1986 1,440,974  426,168 483,949 72,878  457,979  225,809 
1987 1,612,045  446,216 548,040 85,902  531,888  258,226 
1988 1,769,700  457,569 631,629 92,766  587,736  292,208 
1989 1,798,573  471,639 663,559 84,932  578,444  307,871 
1990 1,866,782  506,200 685,800 85,940  588,842  315,059 
1991 2,039,991  518,348 784,500 94,160  642,983  343,013 
1992 2,355,985  542,715 950,570 113,960 748,741  385,693 
1993 2,705,323  568,231  1,141,540 134,470 861,082  432,694 
1994 3,068,902  590,964  1,357,420 152,860 967,658  480,685 
1995 3,415,682  620,516  1,548,030 171,810  1,075,326  527,982 
1996 3,751,889  652,168  1,741,620 186,430  1,171,672  577,753 
1997 4,054,216  674,991  1,938,780 191,310  1,249,136  639,670 
1998 4,376,145  698,610  2,111,330 208,560  1,357,645  693,225 
1999 4,677,572  718,172  2,291,140 217,490  1,450,770  757,902 
2000 5,044,515  735,408  2,515,350 229,820  1,563,938  831,789 
2001 5,433,768  756,000  2,733,437 245,409  1,698,922  917,109 
2002 5,914,265  777,924  3,005,974 266,975 1,863,393  1,012,877 
2003 6,548,284  797,371  3,389,260 299,235 2,062,418  1,109,130 
2004 7,201,992  847,606  3,779,364 323,563 2,251,459  1,220,669 
2005 8,049,764  891,942  4,216,885 375,317 2,565,620  1,369,955 
2006 9,101,666  936,539  4,759,855 439,976 2,965,296  1,563,643 
2007 10,394,290  971,603 5,469,398  511,190 3,442,098  1,813,576 
2008 11,381,661 1,023,861 6,012,531 559,763  3,785,506  2,002,241 
Source: Nominal data are from various issues of China Statistical Yearbook and deflated by implicit national 
accounts sectoral deflators. The NBS post-2004 data have been adjusted according to the results of the 
Second (2008) National Economic Census. 
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TABLE A7 
ESTIMATES OF CHINESE NET CAPITAL STOCK, 1952-2008 
(In billion 1990 yuan) 
  By NBS deflator   By Alternative Deflator 
 ( δ=0.05)   (δ=0.05) (δ=0.07) (δ=Multiple) 
1952  167   167 167 167 
1953  181   177 174 177 
1954  199   192 186 192 
1955  218   208 198 208 
1956  252   233 220 233 
1957  279   256 238 256 
1958  334   304 283 304 
1959  403   367 342 367 
1960  475   413 382 413 
1961  496   429 392 429 
1962  503   435 392 435 
1963  515   449 400 449 
1964  541   464 409 464 
1965  579   496 436 496 
1966  628   538 472 538 
1967  660   565 493 565 
1968  688   588 509 588 
1969  737   629 544 629 
1970  812   694 603 694 
1971  895   761 663 761 
1972  976   830 723 830 
1973  1,062   903 786 903 
1974  1,160   985 859 985 
1975 1,278    1,099  963  1,099 
1976  1,387   1,204 1,055 1,204 
1977  1,497   1,322 1,159 1,322 
1978  1,632   1,453 1,275 1,440 
1979  1,769   1,586 1,392 1,559 
1980  1,924   1,730 1,518 1,689 
1981  2,063   1,876 1,643 1,820 
1982  2,221   2,043 1,790 1,972 
1983  2,402   2,234 1,957 2,146 
1984  2,632   2,462 2,159 2,357 
1985  2,908   2,720 2,390 2,597 
1986  3,212   3,030 2,668 2,887 
1987  3,561   3,382 2,986 3,218 
1988  3,934   3,777 3,341 3,589 
1989  4,209   4,053 3,572 3,838 
1990  4,481   4,334 3,805 4,091 
1991  4,816   4,696 4,118 4,425 
1992  5,267   5,211 4,579 4,864 
1993  5,867   5,834 5,142 5,408 
1994  6,591   6,706 5,946 6,193 
1995  7,416   7,914 7,073 7,303 
1996  8,322   9,318 8,377 8,591 
1997 9,260    10,875  9,814  10,013 
1998  10,314   12,612 11,408 11,593 
1999  11,390   14,544 13,172 13,344 
2000  12,564   16,667 15,100 15,260 
2001  13,873   19,065 17,274 17,423 
2002  15,413   21,903 19,856 19,994 
2003  17,323   25,087 22,746 22,874 
2004  19,546   28,493 25,813 25,933 
2005  22,179   32,379 29,318 29,429 
2006  25,218   36,828 33,334 33,437 
2007  28,626   41,671 37,684 37,780 
2008  32,327   46,896 42,355 42,445 
Sources:   Investment data are from reconstructed official expenditure accounts. See Section 8 
for details of the estimation.  71 
 
TABLE A8 
COMPARISON OF TFP ESTIMATES WITH ALTERNATIVE GDP ESTIMATES USING INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE INCOME WEIGHTS 
(Percent change per annum)  
  Official GDP  Maddison-Wu GDP  GDP as Alternative I  GDP as Alternative II 
  δ=Multiple  δ=0.5  δ=0.7 δ=Multiple  δ=0.5 δ=0.7 δ=Multiple  δ=0.5 δ=0.7 δ=Multiple  δ=0.5 δ=0.7
  NBS Expenditure Accounts Implicit Deflator for Capital Stock 
1952-57 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.5
1957-65 -3.3 -3.3 -3.0 -2.4 -2.4 -2.1 -2.0 -2.0 -1.7 -2.0 -2.0 -1.7
1965-71 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6
1971-78 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 -2.0 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3
1952-78 -1.4  -1.5 -1.3   -0.9  -0.9 -0.7   -0.9  -0.9 -0.7   -0.9  -0.9 -0.7
1978-84 3.4 3.0 3.0 1.4 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.8
1984-91 2.2 2.6 2.6 0.0  -0.1 -0.1 -0.5  -0.7 -0.7 -0.5  -0.7 -0.7
1991-01 3.9 3.7 3.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.9 0.8
2001-08 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1
1978-08 3.1  3.1 3.0   0.9  0.8 0.7   1.1  0.9 0.9   1.2  1.0 1.0
Alternative Deflator for Capital Stock 
1952-57 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.6 2.6 3.1
1957-65 -2.9 -2.9 -2.6 -2.0 -2.0 -1.7 -1.6 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.6 -1.3
1965-71 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
1971-78 -1.9 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7
1952-78 -1.2  -1.3 -1.1   -0.7  -0.7 -0.5   -0.7  -0.7 -0.5   -0.7  -0.7 -0.5
1978-84 3.0 2.5 2.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.3
1984-91 1.9 2.3 2.3 -0.4  -0.5 -0.5 -0.9  -1.0 -1.0 -0.9  -1.0 -1.0
1991-01 2.1 1.9 1.8 -1.3  -1.5 -1.6 -0.9  -1.0 -1.2 -0.7  -0.8 -1.0
2001-08 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.8
1978-08 2.3  2.2 2.2   0.1  -0.1 -0.1   0.3  0.1 0.0   0.3  0.2 0.1
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: Adjusted employment data of “Scenario 3” (Table 1) are used in all models.   72 
 
TABLE A9 
COMPARISON OF TFP ESTIMATES WITH ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES USING INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE INCOME WEIGHTS 
(Percent change per annum)  
  Official GDP  Maddison-Wu GDP  GDP as Alternative I  GDP as Alternative II 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2  Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
  NBS Expenditure Accounts Implicit Deflator for Capital Stock 
1952-57  0.3 0.3 0.3    1.4 1.4 1.9    1.4 1.5 2.0    1.4 1.5 2.0 
1957-65  -3.3 -3.3 -3.3    -2.3 -2.4 -2.4    -1.9 -2.1 -2.0    -1.9 -2.1 -2.0 
1965-71  -0.4 -0.4 -0.4    -0.4 -0.3 -0.3    -0.7 -0.6 -0.7    -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 
1971-78  -1.5 -1.5 -1.5    -1.6 -1.8 -1.9    -2.0 -2.1 -2.2    -2.0 -2.1 -2.2 
1952-78  -1.4  -1.4  -1.4    -0.9  -0.9  -0.9    -0.9  -1.0  -0.9    -0.9  -1.0  -0.9 
1978-84  3.4 3.4 3.4    1.5 1.6 1.4    2.0 1.7 2.1    2.0 1.7 2.1 
1984-91  2.2  2.2  2.2    -0.4 -0.3  0.0    -0.6 -0.5 -0.5    -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
1991-01  3.9 3.9 3.9    0.6 0.5 0.5    1.0 0.9 1.0    1.2 1.1 1.2 
2001-08  2.6 2.6 2.6    2.1 2.1 2.1    2.0 2.2 2.1    2.1 2.3 2.2 
1978-08  3.1  3.1  3.1    0.9  0.9  0.9    1.1  1.1  1.1    1.2  1.1  1.2 
  Alternative Deflator for Capital Stock 
1952-57  0.9 0.9 0.9    2.0 2.0 2.5    2.0 2.1 2.6    2.0 2.1 2.6 
1957-65  -2.9 -2.9 -2.9    -1.9 -2.0 -2.0    -1.5 -1.7 -1.6    -1.5 -1.7 -1.6 
1965-71  -0.3 -0.3 -0.3    -0.4 -0.2 -0.3    -0.6 -0.6 -0.6    -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
1971-78  -1.9 -1.9 -1.9    -1.9 -2.1 -2.3    -2.3 -2.4 -2.6    -2.3 -2.4 -2.6 
1952-78  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2    -0.7  -0.8  -0.7    -0.8  -0.8  -0.7    -0.8  -0.8  -0.7 
1978-84  3.0 3.0 3.0    1.0 1.1 1.0    1.6 1.2 1.6    1.6 1.2 1.6 
1984-91  1.9  1.9  1.9    -0.8 -0.6 -0.4    -0.9 -0.8 -0.9    -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 
1991-01  2.1  2.1  2.1    -1.2 -1.3 -1.3    -0.8 -0.9 -0.9    -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 
2001-08  2.3 2.3 2.3    1.7 1.8 1.8    1.7 1.9 1.8    1.8 2.0 1.9 
1978-08  2.3  2.3  2.3    0.0  0.1  0.1    0.2  0.2  0.3    0.3  0.3  0.3 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: Capital stock data are based on multiple depreciation rates (Table A7) in all models. 
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